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INTRODUCTION

Congress expanded and clarified the jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade (CIT) with the enactment of the Customs Court
Act of 1980.1 The Act creates "a comprehensive system for judicial
review of civil actions arising out of import transactions and federal
statutes affecting international trade."' 2 "Of equal significance to the
Court's expanded jurisdiction in the 1980 Act was Congress' explicit
conferral upon the Court of International Trade of 'all the powers in
law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of
the United States.' '' 3 "Thus, the Act granted this court 'remedial powers co-extensive with those of a federal district court."' 4 "The legisla-

1. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
2. Statement of President Carter, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2183 (Oct. 11, 1980).
See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3729.
3. United States v. Mizrahie, 606 F. Supp. 703, 707 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1585 (1982).
4. Id. at 707, citing H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980). See also Budd
Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 175, 176-78 (1981).
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tive history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 leaves no doubt that
28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1) 'is a general grant of authority for the Court
of International Trade to order any form of relief that it deems appropriate under the circumstances."' 5
Since 1980, literally hundreds of cases have been filed and litigated
before the CIT seeking clarification of legal rights, adherence to agency
and judicial precedent, and administrative determinations in keeping
with the full record compiled by the agency in question. In a number
of cases in the last eight years, litigants have requested that the CIT
invoke one or more of its remedial tools to assure compliance with a
CIT earlier ruling, to obtain adherence to a statutory or regulatory
requirement, to curb perceived dilatory tactics or to maintain control
of the litigation process. The CIT has generally proceeded cautiously
in the utilization of available judicial tools. It attempted to outline
appropriate responses by the party against whom a motion has been
filed, while often expediting consideration of the issue in contention
or imposing tight timetables for admittedly required agency action.
The Chief Judge of the CIT states in his prepared remarks at the
Second Judicial Conference that Americans have a right to expect that public officials act
lawfully, within the bounds of law, and that they strive to
secure the rights of the persons whom they have sworn to
serve, to the best of their ability, and under the law.
The CIT has used the "tool" of judicial review to ascertain
and shed light on how the agencies perform their delegated
responsibilities. Without the beneficial scrutiny of judicial
review, government officials may on occasion forget that all
public servants are duty bound to obey the law, and to protect the rights of the persons whom they are to serve. By
subjecting administrative action to judicial review, we help
achieve and preserve a lawful society consistent with the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the law.6
Stated somewhat differently, due process of law in customs and
international trade cases, as in other federal cases, depends upon
meaningful judicial relief being provided in fact. To the extent that
there is a perception that litigants may face problems in seeking relief

5. Mizrahie, 606 F. Supp. at 707, citing H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980).
6. Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, Statement at the Second Annual Judicial Conference of
the United States Court of International Trade (Oct. 23, 1985).
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and in having relief, in fact, implemented at the appropriate government agency, prompt remedial action by the court is required. In such
circumstances, the full panoply of tools wisely used by federal district
courts to protect their jurisdiction, control their proceedings, and command respect and compliance with their judgments and decrees may
be used to improve the delivery of justice to CIT litigants.
This paper attempts to review broadly the nature of the special
powers available to the CIT, how other federal courts have used such
powers in accomplishing the objectives articulated by Chief Judge Re,
the experience of litigants before the CIT in seeking the utilization
of the special powers, and areas where the need for CIT action may
arise in the future.
II.

A.

SANCTIONS

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 Sanctions

1. Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Supreme Court adopted the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) because of widespread
concern over frivolous lawsuits and abusive tactics by attorneys.
Amended FRCP Rule 11 was intended to discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening
frivolous claims or defenses through greater attention by the district
courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions
when appropriate. 8
Prior FRCP Rule 11 was not effective in deterring abuses. 9 The
ineffectiveness was a consequence of the confusion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard conduct of attorneys who sign pleadings
and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions.10
Consequently, courts were reluctant to impose sanctions.1"
There are several differences between former and amended FRCP
Rule 11. First, the old rule required only that the document have

7. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181
(1985).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
9. Id. See also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1334 (1969).
10. See advisory committee's note, supra note 8, citing RHOADES, RIPPLE & MONEY,
SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

64-65 (1981).
11. See advisory connittee's note, supra note 8.
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"good ground to support it" and be "not interposed for delay." The
new rule which requires prefiling "reasonable inquiry" is geared to
"existing law" and speaks of not being interposed "for any improper
purpose.''2 Second, motions are now specifically within FRCP Rule
11, by specific reference in both FRCP Rules 11 and 7(b)(3).' 3 Third,
"other papers" such as memoranda, briefs, reports, notices, etc., but
not discovery papers (covered under FRCP Rule 26(g)) are not included.' 4 Fourth, parties are now subject to sanctions, even if represented by an attorney.' 5 Fifth, sanctions have been expanded to
include anything "appropriate." Sixth, sanctions under amended FRCP
6
Rule 11 are now mandatory.
Amended FRCP Rule 11 is intended to deter misuse or abuse of
the litigation process and streamline litigation by the imposition of
sanctions.' 7 Under amended FRCP Rule 11, an attorney's signature
on a pleading or motion, certifies that: he has read the document; to
the best of his knowledge, there was a solid legal premise to support
it; and the document was not interposed for delay. 8 Literally, the
rule is directed at the legal merits of a document and attempts to
prevent the filing of frivolous papers. 9 The final prong is concerned
with papers which are not necessarily frivolous, but which are found
to be interposed for an improper purpose. 20 Although the threat of
sanctions for misuse or abuse may tend somewhat to inhibit attorneys,
this is not equivalent to chilling vigorous advocacy.21 Vigorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being free to pursue litigation tactics
that have no legitimate justification.- FRCP Rule 11 in substance
requires the signing lawyer or party, based on a reasonable prefiling
inquiry, to be informed and believe that the paper has a factual and
legal basis and not interposed for delay.- The court may take into

12. Outline of Remarks of Irving R.M. Panzer, D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, at 1 (June
30, 1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
17. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499, 500 (1986). See also advisory committee's note, supra
note 8.
18. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 503.
19. 104 F.R.D. 181, 195 (1985).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See advisory committee's note, supra note 8, citing Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see also Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron,
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account whether the charges appear disproportionate, keeping in mind
the penal and deterrent purpose of FRCP Rule 11.
FRCP Rule 11 has been invoked in numerous cases in the federal
courts since its amendment in 1983. FRCP Rule 11 violations fall into
two general categories: (1) failure to adequately inquire into the facts
or legal merits, and (2) improper purpose, such as harassment, engag2
ing in dilatory tactics, or needlessly adding to litigation costs. 4
Inadequate prefiling inquiry by counsel. Amended Rule 11, imposes an affirmative obligation upon the attorney to make some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and law. 25 "The standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances." "Reasonableness" is determined by investigating the following factors: (1) the time available for
preparation, (2) the extent to which the attorney had to rely on the
client for the underlying facts, (3) whether the document contains "a
plausible view of the law," or (4) whether the attorney relied on local
counsel or other members of the bar. 26 Under the amended rule the
test is objective, what was reasonable to believe under the circumstances at the time of filing,27 as opposed to the subjective test
of whether the document was signed without bad intentions.
Under amended FRCP Rule 11, the courts have addressed the
issue of whether the rule goes to the filing of the document as well
as the research. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudezewicz, 2s the Supreme
Court held incomplete research does not result in a FRCP Rule 11
violation since the rule goes to the filing of the document, not to the
research. Conversely, a total lack of research can result in a FRCP
Rule 11 violation.- 9 In Taylor v. Belger Cartage Service ,3 the Court
held that the failure to ascertain "existing law" violates FRCP Rule 11.

Inc., 808 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing the "willfulness" standard under former Rule 11
and distinguishing Kinee).
24. Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: ContrastingApplications in the Second and FourthCircuits,
46 MD. L. REV. 470, 477 (1987).
25. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 511. See also Chang v. Meese, 660 F. Supp. 782 (D.P.R.
1987).
26. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 511-12.
27. D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 2.
28. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
29. D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 5. See also Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (1986).
30. 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See also Weisman v. Rivlin, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1527
(D.D.C. 1984) (minimal Rule 11 sanction ($200) imposed where complaint, while relying upon
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, shows on its face that there is no diversity); Rowland v.
Fayed, 115 F.R.D. 605 (D.D.C. 1987) (sanctions imposed in diversity action, attorneys had
knowledge of foreign citizenship of the plaintiff and of two defendants, and even the most
unsavory of research would have revealed lack of diversity).
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The most extreme case illustrating the new degree of prefiling
1 In Unioil, plaintiffs
inquiry required is Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton.3
attorney was penalized over $290,000 for instituting a lawsuit without
adequate prefiling inquiry. Counsel filed a massive class action against
a number of large stock brokerage firms, although he had little contact
with co-counsel and the main plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit determined
the standard of "reasonable inquiry" under amended FRCP Rule 11
included foreseeing a suit, which threatens massive liability to multiple
' 32
defendants, that would arouse "a vigorous and costly defense.
3
The lack of "reasonable inquiry" has been found in many cases. 3
Many courts have found a suit to be groundless where obvious deficiencies in the plaintiffs complaint demonstrate that even a minimal investigation by the attorney would have revealed the frivolity of the client's
suit.34
In determining whether allegations of an amended complaint were
well-grounded in fact, the District Court for the Northern District of
California in Kendrick v. Zanides35 held that in light of the record, it
did not appear that a semblance of "reasonable inquiry" had been
made. Similarly, defendants were ordered to pay all reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint that sought relief against defendant
corporate officers individually. Since the defendants completely ignored firmly established precedents directly contrary to their position,
there could be no doubt that counsel failed to conduct the reasonable

31. 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986); Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 6-7.
32. See also Calloway v. Marvell Ent. Group, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (over
$200,000 imposed on plaintiff and attorney, jointly and severally, where plaintiff falsely asserted
that the signature on license agreements was not genuine, and was not sufficiently investigated
by the attorney).
33. See Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 659 F. Supp. 1539 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (no reasonable
basis for making at least two critical allegations in complaint); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
1984) (sanctions were imposed where defendant's counsel
Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 433 (N.D. Ill.
implied, but failed to make a reasonable inquiry, that opposing counsel misrepresented the state
of health of a witness to be deposed based solely on opposing counsel's rescheduling the deposition
until three weeks later). '
34. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 518 n.136. See Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587
F. Supp. 536, 538 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421,
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-51 (D.
Minn. 1984); Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (defendant's
counsel did not meet minimal standards of practice inasmuch as previously stricken affirmative
defenses were raised in response to amended complaint).
35. 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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inquiry as to whether the motion was warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument to expand existing law.In contrast, a "reasonable basis" was found to exist in Leema
Enterprisesv. Willi,37 where the court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. In addition,
the court denied a motion for FRCP Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs counsel. In Leema Enterprises, the plaintiff corporation maintained four correspondent bank accounts in New York, and though
this was held to be an insufficient contact to satisfy due process, the
murky state of the law of personal jurisdiction warranted the conclusion that a valid argument could be made that minimum contacts with
the state existed.
The reasonableness of the investigation should be determined in
light of the situation existing and facts known at the time the pleading,
motion or paper is submitted. 3 In Lee v. Criterion Ins.,- the district
court ruled that insured's decision to proceed with second action
against insurer for disability benefits prior to the final judgment which
concluded that the insured was not entitled to any disability benefits,
did not warrant FRCP Rule 11 sanctions. The court held that, in
determining whether to award FRCP Rule 11 sanctions, the question
to be addressed using an objective standard is whether plaintiffs counsel could have believed, after reasonable inquiry, that pleadings filed
were well grounded in both fact and law.
Improper Purpose of the Pleading. FRCP Rule 11 sanctions will
be imposed where a motion is filed for harassment purposes. Under
this standard the District Court of Colorado in Wold v. Minerals Eng °
assessed attorney's fees against counsel who filed a motion to disqualify
the opposing law firm, which was not based upon a reasonable inquiry
into the relevant facts, but was interposed for the improper purpose
of harassing opposing counsel.
While amended FRCP Rule 11 deleted specific language authorizing
the court to strike sham pleadings,'41 courts, nevertheless, maintain
the power to tailor sanctions to a particular violation. Striking a pleading therefore is an appropriate remedy in some cases.- Federal courts,

36.

National Survival Game, Inc. v. Skirmish U.S.A., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y.

1985).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982).
659 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Ga. 1987).
575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983).
Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 513-14.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol3/iss3/3

8

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND REMEDIES

Stewart: Procedural Issues and Remedies in the Administration and Judicial

however, have been more inclined to impose attorney's fees on the
party introducing sham pleadings. In Hedison Manufacturing v.
NLRB, 43 the district court imposed attorney's fees and all expenses
in light of the totally frivolous nature of the employer's contentions.
Similarly, the plaintiffs and her attorneys' intentional and knowing
conduct in reasserting claims under the Investment Company Act
which were identical to claims that the First Circuit dismissed and
stamped expressly as meritless, warranted dismissal of the claims as
a sham and imposition of sanctions, including attorney's fees. 4"
A motion to dismiss or to strike for failure to comply with FRCP
Rule 11 should not be granted unless the moving party has been
severely prejudiced or misled by the pleader's failure to sign. In
Covington v. Cole,45 the Fifth Circuit decided that sua sponte dismissal
of a complaint with prejudice is not a proper disposition, in light of a
possible technical defect occurring when the spouse signs her husband's
complaint as "attorney in fact." But the court in United States ex rel.
Sacks v. PhiladelphiaHealth Management46 held that the defense
attorney's failure, in a False Claims Act action brought by a private
individual, to sign the answer which contained defendant's counterclaim provided a sufficient basis for striking the counterclaim.
Federal courts have deemed sanctions appropriate where the pleadings or motions filed have been deemed frivolous. The District Court
of Arizona in Felix v. Arizona Department Health Services Goods
(Vital Record Section),' 7 has determined that where plaintiffs allegations purporting to establish plaintiffs action as one in admiralty were
so entirely frivolous and patently groundless, defendants were entitled
to attorney's fees. Similarly, a lawsuit involving the illegal abduction
of a child taken out of the country, brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for failure to enforce a statute prohibiting any person from
leaving the United States without a passport, was held to be frivolous
and filed in violation of FRCP Rule 11. A sanction of attorney's fees
was imposed against the filing attorney. 48 Similarly, under FRCP Rule
11, plaintiffs counsel, who brought actions against seven medical
schools after prior action against those schools had been dismissed,
was required to pay the defendants' costs and attorneys' fees incurred

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

643 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, 97 F.R.D. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
528 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1976).
519 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
606 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ariz. 1985).
Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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in litigating a motion to dismiss based on res judicata in the District
9
Court of Illinois.4
In many cases the courts, even applying the new and stricter
standard, have concluded that FRCP Rule 11 has not been violated
and sanctions are unwarranted. In Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler,
Inc.,- the court held that the defendants' legal theories were not so
unreasonable or so devoid of deposition testimony subject to interpretation as to justify sanctions in connection with their unsuccessful
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's antitrust claims. Also, in
Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., 51 the court decided when defendant
failed to show that the claim was frivolous when filed, and plaintiffs
willingness to confess judgment on the motion to dismiss added further
support that the plaintiff did not act vexatiously or in bad faith, the
filing of the claim was not so meritless as to give rise to an award of
fees.
Sanctions are Mandatory under FRCP Rule 11. The most significant aspect of amended FRCP Rule 11 is that sanctions are now
mandatory. 52 In McLaughlin v. Bradlee,- the court emphasized that
"the amended language of Rule 11 requires the [d]istrict [c]ourt to
impose some form of sanction when warranted by groundless or abusive practices. '"- The courts can impose sanctions on their own motion
to detect and punish violations of the signature requirement. 5 Authority to do so has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional
reluctance of courts to intervene unless requested by one of the parties.The courts retain discretion to tailor the sanction in light of the
kind of violation involved. For example, the court in Taylor v. Belger

49. Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 609 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Il. 1985).
1985).
50. 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill.
51. 105 F.R.D. 567 (D. Colo. 1985).
52. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d at 254 n.7; Cavanagh, supra
note 17, at 513.
53. 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
54. Id. at 1205 (emphasis in the original), citing Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But see Golemi v. Creative Food Design, Ltd., 116 F.R.D. 73
(D.D.C. 1987); Cabell v. Perry, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1078 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1987). But compare
Bell v. Bell, an unpublished opinion of the Fifth Circuit issued September 17, 1986, holding
that the district judge did not err in not sanctioning a defendant even though the judge found
violations of Rule 11 and Rule 26(g). An "appropriate sanction" could include no sanction.
55. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
11.01(4),
56. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
at 11-6 (1987).
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Cartage Services57 held that when attorneys lost sight of their duty
to file and pursue only those cases which they reasonably believe are
well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good-faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,
the party or parties who directly suffer from the attorney's lapse must
be compensated both to make them whole and to remind other lawyers
that they must continuously be aware of their professional responsibility.
Sparrow v. Reynolds 59 is an example of an extreme sanction imposed under FRCP Rule 11. The district court in Sparrow, in addition
to imposing attorney's fees and costs, enjoined the plaintiff from
further access to the federal courts. In addition, the court in Crooker
v. United States Marshalls'Service- imposed a sanction under FRCP
Rule 11 in the form of an order requiring a plaintiff, who brought
over sixty lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act for harassment purposes, to attach to any future complaint a memorandum of
law stating why his claim is not barred by res judicata.Even ultimate
from FRCP
success on the merits does not excuse a litigant or counsel
6
1
abuses.
pretrial
and
discovery
for
liability
Rule 11
Combining FRCP Rule 11 Sanctions with Sanctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and FRCP Rule 26(g) and FRCP Rule 37. An increasing number of courts are combining sanctions under amended FRCP
Rule 11 with sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.62 The federal district
courts have consistently held that the term "vexatiously" in section
1927 requires a subjective "bad faith" test.6 This interpretation is
contrary to ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. EEOC4 in which the Supreme Court held that "vexatiously . . . in no way implies that the
plaintiff's subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee
award against him."

55. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
11.01(4),
56. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
at 11-6 (1987).
57. Taylor, 102 F.R.D. at 181.
58. Id. at 172.
59. 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1986).
60. 641 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1986).
61. Perkinson v. Houlihan's / D.C., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 667 (D.D.C. 1985).
62. D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorizes awards
of costs, including attorney's fees against an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously."
63. See Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F .2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. 434 U.S. 421 (1978).
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In addition, FRCP Rule 11 sanctions are interrelated with sanctions
for excessive discovery abuses under FRCP Rule 26(g) and refusals
to permit discovery under FRCP Rule 37.- Amended FRCP Rule 11
together with the discovery rule sanctions have provided "parties to
civil litigation in district courts with a vast array of weapons to recover
fees incurred in litigation engendered by an attorney or a party's
failure to adhere to reasonable professional standards in bringing or
prosecuting an action, responding to discovery, or participating in
pretrial proceedings. '"-

Unsettled Questions Under FRCP Rule 11. Important questions

67
concerning FRCP Rule 11 remain to be settled by the federal courts.

These questions are also highly applicable to the CIT's ability to control
the litigation process through future use of CIT Rule 11. The concerns
underlying FRCP Rule 11 include the extent to which an attorney
must make a prefiling inquiry. Also unsettled, are the standards for
determining when a pleading is "well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law." Thirdly, the possibility remains that
FRCP Rule 11 sanctions will prove counterproductive by clogging the
courts with costly satellite litigation. Finally, the effect of the certification requirement on discovery summary judgment motions, remains
unsettled.6
Amended FRCP Rule 11 has been effective in deterring frivolous
litigation and abusive practices of attorneys; but concern exists that
it has been applied too broadly. 69 At the May, 1987 Annual Meeting
of the American Law Institute, amended FRCP Rule 11 was attacked
by some speakers as "an unmitigated disaster" and the most objectionable part of the Federal Rules.7The federal courts appear to have applied amended FRCP Rule
11 too broadly as a tool for document management and have undermined the value of open access to court embodied in the liberal pleading

65. See Patton, Review of Sanction Cases in the District of Columbia, presented to Annual
Meeting, District of Columbia Bar, June 30, 1987, at 9.
66. Seldon, Using Monetary Sanctions Under Rule 37 to Improve Your Position on the
Merits, D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 3.
67. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 516-17.
68. Id.
69. See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some Chilling Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensationand Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986).
70. D.C. Bar Seminar on Rule 11, supra note 12, at 13, citing 55 U.S.L.W. 2650 (U.S.
June 2, 1987).
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regime of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 71 Current interpretations of the amended FRCP Rule 11 requirements conflict with the
liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules by demanding greater
specificity in pleading and by discouraging the pleading of novel legal
theories.- FRCP Rule 11 should be interpreted in light of the liberal
pleading rules and in accordance with the legal premises underlying
them.73 Thus, the new criteria for attorney conduct may "chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories." 74

2. Court of International Trade Rule 11
CIT Rule 11 is essentially identical to amended FRCP Rule 11.
The CIT Rule 11, as amended January 1, 1985, provides for sanctions
regarding the signing of pleadings, motions and other papers. CIT
Rule 11 essentially requires that an individual "attorney of record"
sign every pleading. In addition, CIT Rule 11 provides if an attorney
of record does not sign a pleading "it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant." Further, if a party violates this rule the court
will "impose upon the person who signed it, a representing party, or
both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.

'75

The CIT has considered only one case involving CIT Rule 11. The
court in Daewoo Electronics v. United States ,76 stated that the "failure
to be a member of the CIT bar when [the attorney] signed . . .[the]

summons was a mere technical defect which was promptly cured and
which has neither prejudiced nor misled anyone." The court also
determined that the summons was valid and did not have to be refiled.
To date, however, the court has not reached a determination on the
merits for noncompliance with CIT Rule 11.
In applying amended FRCP Rule 11, courts must be discerning in
evaluating cases, and should take precautions to avoid overinclusive,

71. Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 631 (1987).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 651.
74. Fed. R. Cir. P. 11 advisory committe's note.
75. Ct. Int'l Trade R. 11.
76. 655 F. Supp. 508 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
77. Id. at 512.
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heavy-handed approaches which would undercut the policies of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 78 The federal courts, including the
CIT, must strive to achieve a balance when implementing remedial
tools, such as Rule 11 sanctions, to ensure the effective delivery of
justice.
B.

Contempt Sanctions

1. Contempt Power in the Federal Courts
"A contempt of court consists of the disregard of judicial authority.".' 9 A court's ability to punish a contempt is thought to be an
inherent and integral element of its power and has deep historical
roots. 0 The Supreme Court in Ex Parte Robinsonsl stated that the
"power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and
to the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts,
''
and consequently to the due administration (, justice. s2
The power of a district court to punish a contempt by fine or
imprisonment is limited by statute. The legislative statement of the
contempt sanction is 18 U.S.C. § 401. Under
section 401 of Title 18, contempt of a federal court constitutes
misbehavior by any person in the court's presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions,
or disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command issued in a proceedingpending before that court.The court can punish an individual with a number of different sanctions
for failing to comply with an order of a federal court. The most common
sanctions are imposition of a fine, imprisonment, or both, but a federal
court's discretion includes the power to frame a sanction to fit the
violation4 Dismissal of an action is an appropriate sanction where

78. Note, supra note 71, at 639.
79. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2960, at 581.
80. Id. at 582.
81. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874).
82. See also Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (contempt power is rooted in the
inherent power of the judiciary), reh'g denied, 363 U.S. 858 (1960); Eash v. Riggins Trucking,
Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (federal district courts have inherent power to
sanction attorneys for abuse of the judicial process).
83. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2960 (emphasis added).
84. Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966).
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there is a clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that
a lesser sanction will not sufficem
An important distinction, although indefinite and difficult to draw,
is made between acts constituting criminal contempt and those involving civil contempt.86 In general, a contempt of court for which punishment is inflicted for the primary purpose of vindicating public authority
is denominated criminal. Those in which the ultimate object of the
punishment is the enforcement of the rights and remedies of a litigant
are civil contempts 7 The relief granted in civil contempt proceedings
is compensatory or coercive.88 This often takes the form of a fine in
the amount of the damage sustained by the plaintiff and an award of
costs and attorney's fees. 89
A litigant's opponent may also be injured if the litigant violates a
court order.- Thus, a party who is harmed by his opponent's violation
of a court order may institute a private action for civil contempt. 9'
The Supreme Court in McCrone v. United States9 has stated that
civil contempt proceedings to enforce a civil remedy and to protect
the rights of parties to the litigation or someone who has a pecuniary
interest in the subject matter of the injunction should be instituted
by the aggrieved parties. To invoke the court's power the complaintant
must institute a proceeding by presenting the court with an accusation,
pleading, affidavit, or information which sets forth the facts constituting the contempt.93 Proof of the violation must be clear and convincing;
a bare preponderance of the evidence will not suffice. 94

85. Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
86. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
87. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (In civil contempt, time and imprisonment
are employed as coercive sanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his
duty to do.). The test for determining "civil" or "criminal" order is the apparent purpose of the
trial court in issuing a contempt judgment. In re Hunt, 754 F.2d. 1290 (5th Cir. 1985). See also
United States v. North, 621 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (distinguishing factor between
civil and criminal contempt is the purpose for which sentence is imposed).
88. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 439 F.2d 834, 837 (3d Cir. 1971).
89. Dow Chem. Co. v. Chemical Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 945 (1971); Lance, 353 F.2d 585. See also Piambino v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 1210 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (civil contempt is remedial action designed and intended to obtain
compliance with a court order or to compensate for damages sustained as a result from noncompliance).
90. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV.
613, 620 (1983).
91. Id. See Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiffs Remedy When a Defendant
Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971.
92. 307 U.S. 61 (1939).
93. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2960, at 588.
94. Stringfellow v. Haines, 309 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir. 1962); Heinold Hog Mkt., Inc. v.
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The district courts disagree on the precise standards for determining what constitutes contemptuous behavior. Often the district courts
require willfulness and deliberateness. 95 The limitations on the contempt sanction include the requirement of willful misconduct and judi96
cial regard of the contempt sanction as a measure of the last resort.
Some courts appear to impose an even higher standard for imposing
contempt sanctions. For example, the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia employs a "flagrant disregard" standard. The court
in Dean v. Ellington97 determined that absent evidence of a flagrant
bad faith pattern or of plaintiffs repeated refusals to attend depositions, or of an attempt by defendants to proceed their motion to
dismiss with a motion to compel plaintiff to attend deposition, so that
plaintiffs failure to attend the deposition was in contempt of a specific
order, a dismissal of plaintiffs pro se action was not warranted. However, a subsequent violation of a court's order, which compelled the
plaintiffs to appear absent an adequate excuse, could constitute flagrant disregard and willful disobedience of the court's discovery order
required to sustain dismissal as a remedy. However, in Dean, the
court found that the plaintiff was not in contempt of any specific court
order.
But the desire to maintain the incentive for individuals to bring
socially desirable private actions is so important, however, that district
courts sometimes do not require willfulness in imposing contempt sanctions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cook v. OchsnerFoundation Hospitals upheld the propriety of plaintiffs' recovery of damages

McCoy, 700 F.2d 611, 615 (10th Cir. 1983); Piambino, 645 F. Supp. 1210; Duracell, Inc. v.
Global Imports, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
95. Some commentators have suggested that the "contempt sanction is replete with limitations which hamper its effectiveness." Note, Civil Procedure - Federal District Courts Have
Inherent Power to Sanction Attorneys for Abuse of the Judicial Process, 31 VILL. L. REV.
1073, 1073-74 (1986).
96. See Pennsylvania v. Local 542 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Comment, FinancialPenaltiesImposed Directly Against
Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 UCLA L. REV. 855, 862
(1979). See Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (deliberate, willful
and contamacious disregard of judicial processes and rights of opposing parties justifies most
severe sanction); Joshi v. Professional Health Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1985) (to
be held in contempt, party must have knowledge of court's order, ability to comply with order,
and must have directly violated specific court order); General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem.
& Oil Corp., 627 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (power of civil contempt is properly exercised
if order was clear and unambiguous, person had knowledge of the order, and proof of noncompliance with the order is clear and convincing).
97. 115 F.R.D. 576 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
98. 559 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1977).
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and attorneys' fees compensating them for "bringing the appellants'
contempt to the court's attention," despite the absence of proof that
the contemnors' noncompliance had been deliberate.In a number of cases, a question has arisen whether an attorney
may be cited for contempt for delaying or failing to make a response
to a court order compelling discovery. Discovery rules may be used
as a tactical device designed to obstruct the judicial process. 1° "These
abuses frustrate the goal of the Federal Rules to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."11 While the
federal courts are authorized to impose sanctions under FRCP Rule
37(b) for failure to comply with a discovery order, federal courts have
also taken the position that contempt is a proper sanction for the
obstruction of the progress of discovery proceedings where an attorney
willfully or deliberately disregards a court order. 102 Conversely, where
there was no order of a court, or where there was an absence of
willful and deliberate noncompliance by an attorney, opposite results
3
have been reached.10
Contempt proceedings have a special application in the area of
administrative law as illustrated by administrative use of the subpoena
power. To enforce a subpoena, Congress has required each agency to
1°
petition the appropriate district court for an enforcement order. "
"Thus, in the administrative context, contempt proceedings occur only
after a subpoena recipient fails to comply with the court's enforcement
order.",- ° "Failure to comply with a court order enforcing a subpoena
99. Mallor, supra note 90, at 622. CBS Inc. v. Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 1549 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (behavior may be construed as contemptuous even in the absence
of willfulness); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 610 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (defendant's intent
is not in issue in a civil contempt proceeding since willfulness is not an element); Perry v.
O'Donnell, 759 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1985); Piambino, 645 F. Supp. 1210 (failure to comply with
contempt order need not be with the intent to disobey court order, as intent to disobey is not
a prerequisite to finding of civil contempt).
100. Note, The Use of Rule 37(b) Sanctions to Enforce JurisdictionalDiscovery, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 814 (1982).
101. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
102. See Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1979); Payne v. Coates
Miller, Inc., 386 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. App. 3d 1979).
103. See In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979);
Van Hyning v. Hyk, 397 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. App. 3d 1979).
104. Comment, Requirement of Notice of Third-PartySubpoenas Issued in SEC Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 701, 702
703 (1984). "Generally, contempt for noncompliance with an administrative subpoena does not
lie until a federal district court has ordered compliance. A few agency enabling statutes, however,
contain little-used provisions that allow direct agency prosecution for failure to comply with an
agency subpoena." Id.
105. Id. at 703.
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does not justify a contempt holding by the agency that issued the
subpoena." 1 Consequently, the initiation of contempt proceedings
against a noncomplying subpoena recipient can be delayed for long
periods of time.10
Constitutional limitations on the use of contempt sanctions are also
relevant. The contemnor is not entitled to an indictment proceeding
or jury trial before civil contempt sanctions are imposed. However,
due process protections, including ample notice and the opportunity
to be heard, are required. 10 What constitutes sufficient notice and
opportunity is determined by the circumstances of a particular case.10 9
"Alleged civil contemnors also have a due process right to a public
hearing to the extent that such a right does not undermine the secrecy
'
of grand jury proceedings."110
The leading case concerning contempt sanctions and the privilege
against self-incrimination is United States v. Edgerton."' The court
reversed the district court's order which held the defendant guilty of
civil contempt for failing to answer questions at a contempt hearing.
The court reasoned that because the defendant asserted the privilege
against self-incrimination to avoid compelled testimony related to docu112
ments, the order violated the defendant's fifth amendment rights.
Two factors influenced the court's decision. First, the district court
issued the contempt order because of the defendant's refusal to testify
and not for his failure to produce documents. Accordingly, the defendant was not precluded from invoking the fifth amendment privilege
at the contempt proceeding.113 Second, because his fear of self-incrimi114
nation was reasonable, the defendant properly invoked the privilege.

106. Id. at 703 n.10, citing United States v. Vivian, 217 F.2d 882, 883 (7th Cir. 1955)
("contempt holding for noncompliance with court order enforcing administrative subpoena requires separate court proceeding"), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 953 (1956).
107. Id. at 703 n.10, citing United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983) ("expressing
dissatisfaction with twenty-one month delay before recipient of I.R.S. subpoena was found to
be in contempt for refusing to comply with subpoena").
108. Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1982-1983, 72 GEo. L.J. 249, 570 (1983) [hereinafter Thirteenth Annual
Review], citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 633 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 633 F.2d at 756.
110. Thirteenth Annual Review, supra note 108, at 570, citing Matter of Fula, 672 F.2d
279, 283 (2d Cir. 1982); but compare In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. 734 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1984).
112. Id. at 921-22. See Note, Constitutional Law - Fifth Amendment/Civil Contempt, 62
U. DET. L. REV. 521-31 (1985).
113. Edgerton, 734 F.2d at 921-22.
114. Id.
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This decision is in accord with the Third Circuit", in United States v.
Mahady & Mahady.116 The Mahady court held that although a partner
in a law firm can be ordered to produce documents pursuant to an
IRS summons, he cannot be forced to testify. The contempt order,
therefore, was vacated. 117
Further, the United States District Court, for the Southern District
of Florida has held that at all critical stages of a contempt proceeding,
the parties are entitled to guarantees of due process, including notice
of the substance of the hearing.11 8 Thus, the contempt sanctions available to the federal courts, although extremely powerful, are subject
to constitutional limitations.
2.

The Court of International Trade's Use of Contempt Sanctions

The CIT has considered use of the contempt power in only a few
published decisions. In each case private litigants filed a motion to
hold the government in contempt of court. The first decision, American
Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States ' 19 involved a plaintiffs
ex parte motion to hold a District Director of Customs in contempt
for failing to honor the court's previous preliminary injunction. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that the CIT
lacked jurisdiction.'12 Subsequently, the court granted Customs' motion
to dissolve the preliminary injunction and dismissed the action. Thus,
the court also held the plaintiff s motion to hold the District Director
of Customs in contempt as moot.
In Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States,121 plaintiff moved the
CIT to hold certain officials of the Commerce Department in contempt
of court for refusing to resume an investigation to determine if merchandise was being sold in the United States at less than fair value.
The CIT denied the motion since it did not specifically direct the
department to resume the investigation, although this was contemplated. The CIT concluded that "[i]t is a settled safeguard . . .
that the awesome power of contempt is not to be used unless the party
said to be in contempt has been given a clear direction by the court." 122

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Note, supra note 112, at 521-31.
512 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1975).
Compare with Matter of Anonymous, 650 F. Supp. 551 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
Piambino v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
557 F. Supp. 605 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
No. 86-15 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 14, 1986).
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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The third case is Cabot Corp. v. United States.' Previously, the
CIT, had upon review of a countervailing duty determination on carbon
black from Mexico, ruled that Commerce had applied an erroneous
interpretation of the countervailing duty law in holding that subsidies
deemed to be "generally available" to industry in the originating country were not countervailable.1 The CIT on October 4, 1985, remanded
that case with instructions to Commerce to reconsider its measurement
of countervailable subsidies in light of the rule articulated by the
court. 1

Instead of seeking to have the interlocutory order certified,

Commerce filed an appeal as of right which was subsequently dismissed
26

as premature.

The remand results were due thirty days after the court dismissed
the appeal. 1- Commerce sought a further extension after the dismissal
until October 10, 1986, for completing the remand. The CIT granted
this extension by order dated July 2, 1986. Instead of completing the
remand results, Commerce expedited completion of its first review of
the challenged countervailing duty order under section 751 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, in which it did not in fact apply the
court's rule. Commerce then moved to suspend and to vacate the
remand ordered by the CIT in the original investigation. Cabot Corporation filed a motion to show cause why Commerce should not be
held in contempt for failing to obey the remand schedule and delaying
action while expediting its section 751 review. The CIT denied Commerce's motion to suspend the remand and required compliance with
the remand time schedule contained in its July 2, 1986, order, holding
up consideration of Cabot Corporation's motion to show cause and
Commerce's motion for vacatur (CIT Order of September 3, 1986).
Following completion of the remand, the CIT ruled on the motion for
vacatur, vacating a portion of its original judgment, though preserving
the portions which described the proper rule to be applied by Commerce in determining whether domestic subsidies are counteravailable. 1'
Despite the negative results in these few cases in which the CIT
addressed the possible use of the contempt sanction, the court's rules

123.
124.
788 F.2d
125.
126.
127.
128.

Unpublished decision, Nov. 20, 1986.
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade), appeal dismissed,
1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 732.
Id.
Court Order of January 15, 1986.
Cabot Corp. v. United States, unpublished decision, Nov. 20, 1986, at 1-2.
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provide for numerous applications of contempt sanctions. CIT Rule
63 sets forth detailed provisions for civil contempt proceedings. The
sanctions include: (1) a fine including actual damages, (2) other conditions, the performance of which will operate to purge the contempt,
and (3) arrest of the contemnor by a United States marshal, and
confinement until the performance of the condition fixed in the order
and the payment of the fine, or until the contemnor is otherwise
discharged pursuant to law.'29 Several specific rules have been promulgated. The court can hold a deponent in contempt for failure to be
sworn or to answer a question. 130 A party may also be held in contempt
for failure to comply with a discovery order, and the court may issue
a disobedience of court order. 131 Under CIT Rules 45(f) and 53(d)(2),
the CIT may impose contempt sanctions for the failure of a witness
if an afto obey a subpoena. In addition, sanctions may be imposed
32
fidavit for summary judgment is presented in bad faith. 1
Contempt sanctions have provided the federal courts with the
means to control their proceedings, and command respect and compliance with their judgments and decrees. The contempt power is one
of the most powerful tools available to the federal courts. The CIT
has thus far refrained from exercising the power of contempt in cases
where private party litigants have sought to have contempt sanctions
imposed against the government. However, application of the contempt sanction in the future could also arise against private party
litigants who abuse the CIT's judicial process. The court may find it
consistent with its standing as a national federal district court to
develope standards and apply contempt sanctions where appropriate
to control the customs and international trade litigation process,
thereby improving the effective delivery of justice to CIT litigants.
III.

LITIGATION COSTS

A.

Introduction

Under the traditional American rule, all parties involved in litigation in the United States have borne their own costs and attorney's
fees. However, by the late 1930's, American courts, particularly the
federal courts, had developed certain exceptions to the no-fee rule
based on their historic power to fashion equitable remedies. Some of

129.
130.
131.
132.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

Int'l
Int'l
Int'l
Int'l

Trade
Trade
Trade
Trade

R.
R.
R.
R.

63.
37(b).
37(b)(4).
56(h).
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these exceptions evolved as a product of the "inherent power in the
3
courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations.18
The federal courts have recognized several judge-made exceptions
to the American rule where the overall purpose of litigation is better
served. The first exception is when the losing party "has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."' 134 The judicially created bad faith exception- is an exercise of the inherent power
of the court to control its docket and the conduct of the attorneys and
parties before it. 136 Second, under the contempt sanction, a court may
assess attorney's fees for "willful disobedience of a court order . . .
as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant.' 13 7 Third, where as
a result of a party's efforts, a fund is created or preserved for the
benefit of a class, that party may on equitable principles have attorney's fees paid from that fund.138
During the past few decades there has been a tremendous growth
in the number of statutory causes of action that include a provision
for attorney's fees, generally phrased in terms of an allowance to the
prevailing party. 139 One of these, and the most relevant to the CIT,
40
is the Equal Access to Justice Act.'
In addition, the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure represent a new departure from the American rule. These
rules are mirrored to a large extent by the CIT rules. The recent
amendment to FRCP Rule 11, Signing of Pleadings, and to a lesser
extent FRCP Rules 16, Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management, and 26, Discovery, go beyond the bad faith exception in authorizing attorney's fees as sanctions against a broad range of conduct,
which, though amounting to abuse or misuse of judicial processes, falls
short of the willfulness or bad faith requirements. FRCP Rule 37 was
amended to provide attorney's fees to parties prevailing on discovery
motions and against parties failing to comply with discovery orders.

133.

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975); see 10 C.
A. MILLER, supra note 9, §§ 2675-2675.1.
134. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States for use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974) (emphasis added).
135. Courts have defined the term "bad faith" narrowly. Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 507
n.48. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
136. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 873 (1962).
137. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
138. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
139. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (there are more than 150 existing
federal fee-shifting provisions).
140. As extended and amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
WRIGHT &
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In the sections which follow, the principles discussed are applicable
equally to private litigants as well as the government, except where
the government only is identified. Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the exceptions discussed above to the American rule traditionally have not been applicable to the United States government.
The first part of this section discusses how the Equal Access to Justice
Act modifies the doctrine of sovereign immunity, with special emphasis
on the ability of individuals, small companies and organizations to
recover attorney's fees. Next, the legislative history of the statute,
and how the federal courts and the CIT have applied the Equal Access
to Justice Act are discussed, followed by an evaluation of the bad
faith exception as applied to both private litigants and the government.
Concluding this section, is an analysis of the CIT rules relating to the
award of attorney's fees as well as miscellaneous cases.
B.

The Equal Access to Justice Act

1. Legislative History of the Equal Access to Justice Act and Application
of the Act in the Federal Courts
Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act [EAJA]141 in
order to reduce the disparity of resources between the government
and individuals seeking enforcement of private rights against the
United States government. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418 sets forth the
purpose of the bill:
The bill rests on the premise that certain individuals,
partnerships, corporations and labor and other organizations
may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against
unreasonable governmental action because of the expense
involved in securing the vindication of their rights. The
economic deterrents to contesting governmental action are
magnified in these cases by the disparity between the resources and expertise of these individuals and their government. Accordingly, the bill entitles certain prevailing parties
to recover attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United States, unless the government
action was substantially justified. Additionally, the bill ensures that the United States will be subject to the common
law and statutory exceptions to the American rule regarding
attorney fees. This change will allow a court in its discretion
to award fees against the United States to the same extent
42
it may presently award such fees against other parties.1
141.
142.

Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2328 (1980), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEWS 4984.
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The former version of 28 U.S.C. § 2412, provided that costs, but
not attorney's fees, may be awarded against the United States.'4
EAJA makes two major changes in the previous law.'First, EAJA permits a court in its discretion to award attorney's
fees and other expenses to prevailing parties in civil litigation against
the United States in the same situations where such fees and expenses
could be awarded against private litigants. 145 "[T]he change simply
reflects the belief that, at a minimum, the United States should be
held to the same standards in litigating as private parties.' ' 46 The
change reflects the strong movement by Congress under section 2412
towards equalizing the position of the federal government and civil
litigants.'4 7 Thus, the discussion of case law where bad faith tactics
were used as a basis for imposition of attorney's fees and expenses is
applicable to the United States through the EAJA.
Second, the bill made a significant change in the previous law
regarding attorney's fees for relatively small litigants by establishing
a general statutory exception for an award of fees against the government. 1 Under the new exception certain parties who prevail in adversary adjudications or civil actions brought by or against the United
States are entitled to attorney's fees and related expenses unless the
government action was substantially justified or special circumstances
would make an award unjust. '9 To qualify for this exception, the
"party" seeking fees and expenses must qualify under the following
definition:
(B) "party" means (i) an individual whose net worth did
not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed,
or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any
partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed
$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which
had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action
was filed; except that an organization described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of
such Code, or a cooperative association, as defined in section

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 4987.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 142, at 4987.
Id.
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15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. §
1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such
organization or cooperative association.150
Congress was especially concerned with the deterrent effect
created by the inability to recover fees against the government in
light of the rapid growth of government regulations.151 "[T]he Government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce
compliance with its position. ' 1 52 As reviewed above, this special statutory exception to the American rule was focused on those individuals
for whom costs may be a deterrent to vindicating their rights.-5
"Where parties are serving a public purpose, it is unfair to ask them
to finance through their tax dollars unreasonable Government action
and also bear the costs of vindicating their rights."'- Congress desired
to improve citizen access to courts and administrative proceedings.- 5
By allowing an award of reasonable fees and expenses against the
government for those parties least likely to be able to contest government action when the government's action is not substantially justified,
the statute was intended to provide individuals an effective legal or
administrative remedy where none previously existed.156 Congress
wanted the administrative decisions to reflect informed deliberation. 157
"In so doing, fee-shifting becomes an instrument for curbing excessive
regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government authority."'Most of the controversy and case law under EAJA has involved
the statutory exception for small litigants under section 2412(d)(1)(A).
Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion pertains exclusively
to the legislative history and case law of this small company/individual
exception to the American rule vis-A-vis the United States.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)

In section 2412, Congress expressly stated an applicable standard
under the special exception and articulated a purpose for the standard.
Fees will be awarded under EAJA unless the government can show

150.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1985).

151.

1980 U.S.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4991.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 142, at 4988.
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that its action was "substantially justified" or that "special circumstances make an award unjust."'1 9 "This standard balances the
constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws
are faithfully executed against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their rights."'16 The applicable test of whether the
government's action is "substantially justified" is one of reasonableness. Thus, where the government demonstrates that its case had a
reasonable basis in both law and fact, no award will be made. 161 Accordingly, Congress placed the burden of proof on the government.
Congress also intended the definition of the term "prevailing party"
to be consistent with the law that has developed under existing statutes. 162 The phrase was not intended to be limited to a victor after
entry of final judgment following a full trial on the merits.163 Further,
EAJA was intended to be a limited experiment.'- The bill contained
a sunset provision which was to repeal the relevant amendments to
61 5
titles 5 and 28 at the end of three years.
a.

Awards of Litigation Costs in the. Federal Courts During the
Experimental Period

The federal court cases decided under EAJA during the three year
period presented conflicting interpretations of the statutory language. 1' "These conflicts . . . resulted in a paucity of fee awards
under the Act. "167 Congress reported that during the three year period
only $3.9 million was awarded, which was dramatically less than the
$100 million annual projection. 16
The problem was chiefly attributed to the agencies and courts
misconstruing EAJA. 169 During this period it was unclear whether the
"position of the United States" included the government's prelitigation
actions and its litigation posture. 170 Some courts construed the "position

159. Id. at 4989.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4990.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 4991-92.
165. Id.
166. Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1089, 1117 (1984).
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 132, 137.

169.
170.

Id.
Note, supra note 166, at 1117.
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of the United States" which must be "substantially justified" as limited
to the government's litigation position but not the government's action
which led to the litigation. 171 Thus, a number of meritorious fee claims
were denied because the courts failed to focus attention on the unjustified government activity that formed the basis of the litigation. '72
Other courts interpreted the section to include both the government's litigation position and the government's action which led to
the litigation.173 The District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in Environmental Defense Fund v. Watt174 recognized that "[i]f
the government's litigation position was the sole consideration, the
government could insulate itself from fee liability simply by conceding
error or settling, because such actions will always be deemed 'reasonable' litigation positions; thereby having the effect of substantially
justifying their position.' ' 75. In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 176 the Third Circuit realized that unless EAJA applied to both
the litigation arguments and to the underlying action which made the
suit necessary, the incentive for careful agency action would be removed, and congressional intent undermined.177
The courts failed to produce a clear standard for ascertaining when
the government's action is "substantially justified." Some courts held

171. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 137 n.14, 140 n.21,
citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The only government "position" to be
scrutinized in the context of an EAJA case is that taken in the litigation itself.), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 936 (1984)); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1982); Broad
Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Operating
Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 493-95 (D. Utah 1982), affd, 737 F.2d
860 (10th Cir. 1984); Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp. 225 (D.
Md. 1981); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1115 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (1984);
United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom. Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 825 (1984). See also S & H
Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm., 672 F.2d 426 (5th
Cir. 1982).
172. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 140 & n.22 (citing
Alspach, 527 F. Supp. 225); Del Mfg. Co. v. United States 723 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hill
v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 428 (1983); Greenberg v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 406 (1983); Clark
v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 194 (1983).
173. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 137 n.14 (citing Moholland
v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982) ("position" includes agency action)); NunesCorreia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1982); Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 703
F.2d 700, 706-7 (3d Cir. 1983); Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1984). See
also Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1982).
174. 554 F. Supp. 36, 41 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1983).
175. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 141.
176. 703 F.2d 700, 710 (3d Cir. 1983).
177. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 141.
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that "substantial justification" means more than merely reasonable.17s
Other courts have effectively stated that even an administrative decision which was reversed because it was arbitrary and capricious or
lacked substantial evidence, may be "substantially justified" under
EAJA.79
During the experimental period there was also a lack of a clear
definition among the federal courts for defining who is a "prevailing
party."',s Although the term "prevailing party" is not defined, the
legislative history of EAJA indicates that courts should construe the
term consistently with its use in other fee shifting statutes. 81 A major
problem was that the district courts failed to articulate a generally
applicable standard when interpreting whether a party had prevailed.11 The ad hoc decisions have resulted in conflict over the meaning of "prevailing party." For example, in Miller v. Schweiker'- the
district court "found that a party who had lost an administrative adjudication, but whose appeal before a district court resulted in a remand to the agency for reconsideration, was not a 'prevailing party'
because the benefit sought was not received. 14 Conversely, MacDonald v. Schweiker 54 held that a party whose case had similarly
been remanded was a "prevailing party" for purposes of an EAJA
claim. 1
Although the district courts did not reach uniform results, several
general principles for ascertaining who is a "prevailing party"
emerged.187 First, to prevail in a fully litigated suit, the court's decision
1
must benefit the party, and the ruling must be on the case's merits. 88

178. Id. at 138 n.15, citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 936 (1984); Ulrich v. Schweiker, 548 F. Supp 63, 65 (D. Idaho 1982); Nunes-Correia,
543 F. Supp. 812, 817 (D.C.C. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Idaho
1982); Enerhaul v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 718 F.2d 1115 (1983).
179. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 168, at 138, citing Spencer v.
NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dicta), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); Gava
v. United States, 699 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
180. Note, supra note 166, at 1117.
181. Comment, United States Liability for Attorneys' Fees Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 805, 815 (1986). See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note
142, at 4990, citing NLRB v. Doral Bldg. Serv., Inc., 680 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982) (for purposes
of defining "prevailing party," EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are indistinguishable).
182. Note, supra note 166, at 1094.
183. 560 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
184. Id.
185. 553 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. Note, supra note 166, at 1095.

187. Id.
188.

Id.
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A party has prevailed for purposes of EAJA if the party succeeds on
a "significant issue in litigation" and derives a "benefit" from the
suit. 8 9 A plaintiff who succeeds on any significant issue and achieves
some benefit may be considered a "prevailing party."'1
b. Subsequent Amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act
Congress extended certain provisions of EAJA which expired on
September 30, 1984. It also made clarifying technical and substantive
amendments, and thus made amended EAJA permanent. 19' In the
amended statue, Congress clarified its intent to give the language the
"position of the United States" which must be "substantially justified"
a very broad meaning rather than an overly restrictive one, which
1
had previously been used to help the government escape liability. '
Congress reiterated that the express intent of the original statute
included both the government's litigation position as well as the
agency's action which led to the litigation. The statute clarified the
congressional intent that the "position of the agency" included both
an agency's actions and omissions which formed the basis of the adversary adjudications. 193 The amendment made it clear that "the congressional intent is to provide attorneys' fees when an unjustifiable agency
action forces litigation, and the agency then [tries] to avoid such liability by reasonable behavior during the litigation. '",
By reason of the amendment, the United States will be liable unless
the position of the government, including the agency's action or omissions upon which the administrative proceeding or civil action is based,

189. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (lst Cir. 1978). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (Supreme Court quoted the Nadeau standard with approval).
See also United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 1980) (fact that
plaintiffs did not prevail under all their theories and did not receive the relief requested did
not preclude them from receiving attorneys' fees, but the result attained was to be considered
in setting the amount of award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party pursuant to the statute);
Resig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (Although
only prevailing parties may recover attorneys' fees, a party may prevail without obtaining formal
relief.).
190. Note, supra note 166, at 1095. See also Von Luetzow v. Director, OPM, 562 F. Supp.
684, 685-86 (D.D.C. 1983) (EAJA request was denied where claimant had not received any part
of the benefits sought); Rico-Sorio v. United States I.N.S., 552 F. Supp. 965, 968 (D. Or. 1982)
(Although under EAJA the court may award attorneys' fees to a party who has prevailed on
less than all of his case, generally, the court may award such fees only if the plaintiff prevailed
on the merits of at least some of his claims.).
191. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 168, at 132.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 137.
194. Id. at 140.
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as well as the litigation position, is "substantially justified," or unless
special circumstances would make an award unjust.195 "Substantial
justification" now means more than merely reasonable.196 Because of
the wide variety of factual contexts and legal issues involved in government disputes, courts will determine what is "substantially justified" on a case-by-case basis.197
The House Report states that "[a]gency action found to be arbitrary
and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually certain not to have been substantially justified under the Act." 198 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Federal Election Commission v. Rose,-9 has indicated that this statement is an
unsupported "offhanded generalization." "This appears, in retrospect,
to have been uninformed ipse dixit.' '200 Further, sponsors in both
Houses repudiated this apparently staff-produced statement. 2°1 The
Rose court further stated that under EAJA the courts should examine
through a prism both the government's l~i"ation position and the
underlying conduct. 202 Thus, the court must "reach a judgment inde' '2
pendent from that of the merits phase. 03
The intent of EAJA is not to "chill public officials charged with
enforcing the law from vigorously discharging their responsibilities. "2
Changes which merely clarified existing law are to be retroactively
applied, while changes which expand or change the law are to take
effect on the date of enactment. 20 5
c.

Awards of Litigation Costs in the Federal Courts After the
EAJA Amendments

As reviewed above, there was initially confusion in the federal
courts over three issues regarding the implementation of EAJA. Since
the 1985 amendment, the courts appear to have adopted more consistent views concerning those three issues and have developed clearer

195.

Id. at 135.

196.

Id.

197.

Id. at 138.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
United
204.
205.

Id.
806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1090.

Id.
Id.
Id. This analysis was followed by the CIT in Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori v.
States, 658 F. Supp. 902, (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), affd, 837 F.2d 465 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 168, at 139.
Id.
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standards. The courts have adhered to Congress' desire for the entitlement to fees to be based upon a consideration of the government's
action which led to the litigation as well as the government's litigation
position. For example, the Ninth Circuit in League of Women Voters
v. FCC- recognized that in deciding whether the government is liable
for attorney's fees under EAJA, the court should consider both the
reasonableness of the government's position at trial and the nature of
the challenged government action.20 The court, however, did not determine whether the underlying government action, enactment of a
statute, was reasonable because the government did not argue in
support of the statute and did not oppose the plaintiffs in any substantial manner. 2"
The federal courts have also interpreted when the government's
position is "substantially justified" in a more consistent manner. The
test for whether the government's position was "substantially justified"
is whether it posited a colorable interpretation. 2°9 Thus, once the party
seeking an award of attorney's fees and expenses under EAJA demonstrates that it has qualified and has prevailed, the government bears
the burden of demonstrating that its position was "substantially justified. '210 To meet this burden, the government must make a strong
showing.211
The courts have also developed a "substantial evidence test" for
determining whether the government's position is "substantially justified." A recent district court case held that an agency's position in
litigation is not "substantially justified" and attorney's fees are properly awardable under EAJA where the factual findings of an agency
are not supported by "substantial evidence. ' 212 Similarly, the government's position in litigating a disability claim was not "substantially
justified" since the claim was well documented and supported by ample
medical evidence, and the administrative law judge refused the claim
only by substituting his own medical judgments for that of competent
medical witnesses.213

206. 798 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. at 1258.
208. Id. at 1259.
209. In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1985); League of Women Voters v. FCC, 798 F.2d
1255 (9th Cir. 1986); Stone v. Heckler, 658 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
210. Viktoria-Schaefer Int'l v. United States Dep't of Army, 659 F. Supp. 85 (D.D.C. 1987);
McQuiston v. Marsh, 790 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1986). See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-11 (1980); S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 21 (1979).
211. Stone, 658 F. Supp. at 675.
212. Walden v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
213. Silva v. Bowen, 658 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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The federal courts also have refined the standards for assessing
who is a "prevailing party." The test for determining whether a party
has "prevailed" has recently been restated in terms of whether the
party has substantially received the remedy requested or has successfully disposed of the central issue, or whether plaintiffs lawsuit motivated a settlement wherein the defendant provided the primary relief
sought in litigation.214 The court focuses on the litigation's substance
and not merely on the technical outcome of the case to determine
whether a plaintiff substantially prevailed in its position. 215 Further,

a claimant whose benefits are reinstated after passage of legislation,
is a "prevailing party" within the meaning of EAJA. 216 The determina-

tion of whether a litigant is a prevailing party is a factual one and
the district court's findings of fact may not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous.

217

The federal courts appear now to be conforming to the legislative
intent of EAJA by balancing the inequities of private litigants faced
with the task of challenging erroneous government action. The CIT
should follow the trend in the other federal courts with a more expansive reading of the EAJA.
d. Equal Access to Justice Act in the Court of International Trade
The first case in which the CIT considered awarding attorney's
fees under the EAJA21s was Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United
States 2 9 [Bar Bea I]. In Bar Bea I, the plaintiff sought attorney's
fees and other expenses as a prevailing party under EAJA. CIT held
the plaintiff had "unclean hands" since the plaintiffs sole purpose was
to hold a customs house cartage license for use by the co-plaintiff.
The court applied the special circumstances "safety valve" of EAJA21
to deny counsel fee awards as "unjust." On plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration, the court in Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United

214. Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1985).
215. Kopunec v. Nelson, 801 F.2d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1986).
216. Stone, 658 F. Supp. at 670.
217. McQuiston v. Marsh, 790 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1986).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1985).
219. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 137 (1982) [hereinafter Bar Bea I].
220. Id. at 138.
221. The safety valve provision is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which states "a
court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses
• . .unless special circumstances make an award unjust."
222. Bar Bea I, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 139.
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States-3 [Bar Bea II] reiterated its conclusion that the EAJA claim
was "totally lacking in merit."
In Luciano Pisoni FabbricaAccessori v. United States- pursuant
to CIT Rule 68,2 plaintiffs who successfully challenged an antidumping
duty order sought an award of attorneys' fees and expenses under
EAJA. The United States Department of Commerce had initially
issued a final ruling pursuant to section 735(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) which determined that products were being sold in the United States at less than fair value.
Subsequently, the court issued an opinion remanding the action to the
agency. On remand, the Department of Commerce made a merchandise
adjustment and found the weighted-average dumping margin to be de
minimis and concluded the merchandise was not being sold in the
United States at less than fair value.- The agency then issued a
notice revoking the antidumping duty order with respect to the plaintiffs.m The CIT denied plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees finding
that
[i]t is consistent with the intent of the EAJA and its legislative history for a court to conclude that the action taken
by the agency at the time was clearly reasonable even though
such action is later found to be unreasonable after having
run the gamut of the legal process.The court reached this outcome despite noting a recent standard
enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Gavette
v. Office of PersonnelManagement.2 In Gavette the court determined
that "[i]t is not sufficient for the Government to show merely 'the
existence of a colorable legal basis for the government's case.' ' ' 0 Ac-

223. Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 167 (1982) [hereinafter
Bar Bea II]. See Donner Mountain Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 331 (1985). CIT
also denied a request for attorney's fees and other expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)
(1982), although the plaintiff successfully challenged a customs classification. The CIT refrained
from reexamining the merits of the position taken by the Customs Service at the administrative
level, since the government expeditiously adopted the plaintiff's position in the case at chief.
Id. at 332.
224. Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 902 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), affd, 837 F.2d 465 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
225. CIT Form 15 must be filed by an EAJA claimant in the CIT.
226. Luciano, 658 F. Supp. at 902.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 905.
229. 808 F.2d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 1467.
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cording to the court, "'substantial justification' requires that the Government show that it was clearly reasonable in asserting its position,
including its position at the agency level, in view of the law and the
facts." 2 31 Thus, "[t]he government must show that it has not 'persisted
in pressing a tenuous factual or legal position, albeit one not wholly
without foundation.' ' 32 The court in Luciano justified the denial of
costs, despite the Gavette decision, by concluding that the "substantial
justification" standard is distinct from whatever standard is applicable
to the underlying decision on the merits.m Thus, "[a]n independent
analysis employing EAJA principles can result in a finding that the
position of the United States at the litigation stage and the agency
level was 'substantially justified' despite a finding on the merits that
the agency action must be reversed because it was unreasonable. '"The first EAJA case decided by the CIT in which attorneys' fees
were awarded, concerned a Customs decision appeal in Bonanza
Trucking Corp. v. United States .35 The court determined that the
Customs Service denied the plaintiff meaningful opportunity to be
heard, under the fifth amendment, because it refused to provide documents in support of the revocation decision, and denied plaintiff meaningful cross-examination regarding the former president's testimony
during the felony prosecution.3 6 Following entry of judgment enjoining
the Commissioner of Customs for revoking its licenses to cart bonded
merchandise and to operate a container station based on the agency
record, the plaintiff sought an award of attorney's fees and expenses.
The claim was based under section 2412(d)(1)(A) for costs incurred
during the judicial proceedings and under section 2412(d)(3) for costs
incurred during the underlying administrative proceedings. Plaintiff
also sought an award under EAJA subsection (b) which provides the
United States "shall be liable for . . . fees and expenses to the same
extent that any other party would be liable under the common law." 7

231. Id. (emphasis in the original).
232. Id.
233. Luciano, 658 F. Supp. at 905.
234. Id. See FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1086-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The court in Luciano
was not persuaded by the House Report, H.R. REP. No. 120, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 132, 138, stating that "[a]gency action found to be arbitrary and
capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually certain not to have been substantially justified under the Act." Luciano 654 F. Supp. at 905. The Luciano court relied on the
Rose court's analysis which illustrates this statement is an unsupported generalization, as evidenced by renunciations of the statement in both Houses. Id. See Rose, 806 F.2d at 1089-90.
235. No. 87-70 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 18, 1987).
236. Bonanza Trucking Corp. v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 1170 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
237. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1985).
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In contrast to the earlier CIT cases concerning EAJA, the Customs
Service "asserted that it was not required to produce any evidence
in support of its decisions to revoke the company's licenses."
Bonanza is significant since the court permitted partial recovery
despite plaintiffs failure to file within EAJA's specified time period.
EAJA requires that a request for an award under subsection (d) be
filed "within thirty days of final judgment."
The court, following
Luciano, allowed recovery of attorneys' fees despite plaintiff's filing
an EAJA claim ninety days after entry of judgment. Luciano held
that since the government had sixty days to appeal the underlying
judgment, the plaintiff had a total of ninety days within which to file
its application. 239 CIT has thus developed a consistent approach to the
applicable time periods for filing EAJA claims, which logically interprets the statute.
The plaintiff failed to carefully adhere to CIT Rule 68, which
specifies both the form and content of any such application. 24° The
court permitted partial recovery of the claimed costs despite several
such deficiencies. The court denied recovery of counsel fees for one
attorney, however, who failed to provide detailed time records. The
same problem existed in another affidavit for small amounts of work
performed by several other attorneys and a variety of law clerks.
Conversely, fees were permitted to be recovered for one attorney
despite plaintiffs failure to submit a bill of costs as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1920, or an itemized statement of expenses as contemplated
by EAJA subsection (d)(1)(B). Recovery of a second attorney's fees
was also permitted despite an affidavit which contained barely
adequate descriptions of the services performed.~1 An award of attorney's fees was also claimed for work performed by a summer law
clerk. The court concluded that "[w]hile Congress may not have precisely contemplated law clerk research in defining 'fees and other
expenses' in EAJA, the chosen definition is broad enough to cover
42
such work.'
The plaintiff sought recovery of attorney's fees at the rate of $175
per hour. Under EAJA subsection (d), attorney's fees are not awarded
in excess of $75 per hour unless justified by a "special factor." Fees
were awarded for the two attorneys at the rate of only $75 per hour

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1985).
Luciano, 650 F. Supp. at 904.
Bonanza Trucking Corp., No. 87-70, slip op. at 29.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 32.
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since the plaintiff failed to show the existence of a "special factor."
The court also permitted recovery of fees for the summer law clerk
based upon his rate of compensation, but rejected recovery for those
services at the rate of $75 per hour and the rate at which the client
was billed for the summer law clerk's services was unreasonable under
the circumstances. =
During EAJA's initial three year experimental period, CIT decided
only Bar Bea I & H and Donner Mountain under EAJA subsection
(d)(1). The court applied EAJA in a conservative manner. CIT's denial
of relief is consistent with the approach taken by the federal courts
during that period. Less than two percent of the projected funds were
actually awarded during the experimental period. 2" Two cases decided
after the EAJA amendment, Luciano and Bonanza, reflect conflicting
EAJA analyses. The court in Bonanza developed standards consistent
with the emerging trend in the other federal courts which should
further the legislative intent of EAJA. The CIT should continue to
apply EAJA as in Bonanza to ensure the effective delivery of justice
to CIT litigants who qualify to invoke the special exception of 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
C.

Bad Faith Exception

1. Awards in the Federal Courts under the Bad Faith Exception
The most versatile exception to the American rule is based on the
existence of bad faith on the part of one of the litigants, and is avowedly
punitive. 2- This exception is applicable to EAJA claimants under subsection (b) which provides for recovery of expenses to the same extent
any other party would be liable under the common law and specifically
under subsection (c)(2) where the United States has acted in bad faith.
In addition to allowing recovery against the government, the bad faith
exception is the major doctrine for recovery against a party's private
litigant opponents. Clearly, of the major punitive exceptions to the
American rule designed to deter abuses of the judicial system, the
bad faith exception has the greatest potential for deterring the
broadest range of abuses.m
Although the bad faith exception arose in equity cases, courts have
not limited the exception just to suits in equity. 24 7 In bad faith excep-

243.

Id. at 31.

244.
245.
246.
247.

See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 168, at 137.
Mallor, supra note 90, at 630.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 630-31 n.123.
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tion cases, the courts typically award fees to prevailing parties only.
However, where the bad faith exception is unrelated to the merits of
the case, courts have awarded fees to nonprevailing parties.
The
bad faith exception includes both conduct preceding and occurring
during litigation. 249 "The exception embraces three variants of misconduct, all of which constitute abuse of the judicial system: obdurate or
obstinate conduct that necessitates legal action; bad faith in propounding a frivolous claim, counter claim or defense; and vexatious conduct
occurring during the course of litigation. '"
Many of the cases are concerned with substantive bad faith which
includes the assertion of frivolous claims, counterclaims and defenses. 25
Courts and private parties harmed by frivolous claims are partly compensated by the punitive and deterrence goals of the bad faith exception.2 2 Theoretically, groundless litigation decreases since the filing
party must pay the portion of the opponent's expenses in opposing
the claim.2 A party can even be held liable for the full defense expenses if bad faith prevades.
In determining the existence of bad
faith, the trial court considers whether the issue was one of first
impression, whether a real threat of injury to plaintiff existed, whether
the trial court found the suit frivolous, and whether the record would
support that finding.Developing a workable standard is the district courts' major challenge. 2r The federal courts apply an objective standard to the defendant's prelitigation conduct, but require more to show bad faith when
a party is asserting a substantive claim or defense.2 57 Except in obvious
cases, such as relitigating an issue that is res judicata or sham pleadings, what conduct will be awarded attorney's fees is questionable.8

248. Id. at 631-32. See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 943 (1972); Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1042 (1st Cir.
1971). See also Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1362 (3d Cir. 1981).
249. Mallor, supra note 90, at 632; Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th Cir.
1976).
250. Mallor, supra note 90, at 632.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 638-39.
253. Id. at 639. See Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
254. Ellington v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
255. Thomas v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 659 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
256. Mallor, supra note 90, at 639.

257.
258.

Id.
Id.at 640.
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"The weight of authority indicates that a claim will not be found to
have been so meritless as to justify an award of fees if it was colorable
when instituted." 59 "Even the assertion of claims that appear to be
without reasonable legal merit is apparently insufficient to justify the
''2
imposition of fees for substantive bad faith. 60

A two step analysis of the claimant's conduct determines substantive bad faith.261 First, the court determines objectively whether the
claim had any legal or factual merit. If the claim was colorable the
inquiry ends. 262 However, if a court finds a claim lacks merit, a subjective standard is used to ascertain whether any evidence of improper
purpose exists. 20 Several courts justify this rigorous subjective standard as a means to ensure that plaintiffs with meritorious but novel
claims are not deterred from bringing a suit.2r2
To prevent the deterrence of meritorious claims from seeking judicial resolution, courts should confine the sanction of imposing attorney's fees to those who should know that the suit is impermissible
based on their improper motives.2 The balance between maintaining
free access to the courts and deterring groundless claims is perhaps
impossible to strike. 26r The inability of litigants to assess accurately

the merit or lack of merit of their claims complicates the formulation
of a standard.

267

Another group of cases are concerned with procedural bad faith.
A litigant's vexatious conduct that causes the opponent to incur unnecessary expenditures can be assessed the attorney's fees attributable
to these bad faith procedural maneuvers.26 8 Examples of sanctioned

procedural abuse include "the concealment of assets and falsifications
of records, the refusal to produce documents ordered by the court,
the frivolous removal of a case to federal courts, and the launching

259. Id. See Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 182; Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir.
1980) (an award of fees may not be justified even if the party's claim appears to lack factual
merit at the time the case is filed); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560
F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977).
260. Mallor, supra note 90, at 640-41. See Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617
F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980).
261. Mallor, supra note 90, at 641.
262. Id. at 641-42; see Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 182.
263. Mallor, supra note 90, at 642.
264. Id. See Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 349-50; Browning Debentures Holders' Comm., 560 F.2d
at 1088.
265. Mallor, supra note 90, at 642.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 643.
268. Id. at 644. See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., 560 F.2d at 1088-89.
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of extensive discovery aimed at making out a class action after the
court has denied the maintainability of a class action." 2 9 Bad faith has
also been found where a motion which was completely unsupportable
was denied and movant's attorneys were ordered to pay reasonable
expenses incurred as a result.270
When procedural abuse is alleged, courts are more inclined to determine bad faith on an objective basis.271 In Cornwall v. Robinson, a
case dealing with an allegedly frivolous removal to federal court, the
court discussed the "intent-laden terminology" and rejected the application of a negligence standard for the bad faith exception. 272 FRCP
Rule 11 requires that pleadings be made in good faith. Instead of a
subjective bad faith test, awarding attorney's fees requires an objective test of reasonableness under the circumstances. 27 3 Therefore, the
use of an objective standard that would permit a judge to infer bad
faith from an observation that a procedural maneuver was unduly
dilatory or without reasonable foundation would be justifiable in cases
274
concerning procedural abuse.
Thus, the bad faith exception to the American rule is applicable
to awards of attorney's fees against both the government using EAJA,
and private litigants. The federal courts have applied the bad faith
exception in two major and extremely broad applications, involving
both substantive and procedural bad faith. This exception is a very
powerful tool which the federal courts have utilized sparingly to control
the litigation process.
2. Awards in the CIT under the Bad Faith Exception
The same problems and potential applications concerning the bad
faith exception are applicable to the CIT. The court has denied a
request for an award of attorney's fees under the bad faith exception
of EAJA in Atochem v. United States.275 In Atochem, an importer
sought an award of counsel fees pursuant to the provisions of EAJA
based upon failure of the ITA [International Trade Administration]
to revoke an antidumping order. The plaintiff relied on the bad faith
exception under EAJA. Plaintiff alleged detrimental reliance on ITA's
telephone assurances that there would be a revocation of the dumping

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Mallor, supra note 90, at 644.
Vegetable Kingdom, Inc. v. Katzen, 633 F. Supp. 917 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
Mallor, supra note 90, at 645; Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
Mallor, supra note 90, at 645 n.221.
EEOC v. Sears & Roebuck Co., 114 F.R.D. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
Mallor, supra note 90, at 645.
609 F. Supp. 319 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

39

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 3

[Vol. 3

finding in the final results of the second 751 review in issue. After
plaintiff filed a civil action with the CIT, the ITA later published a
notice revoking the dumping finding. 27 6 The producer of material affected by the antidumping order was not entitled to attorney's fees
under the bad faith exception. Although the EAJA claimant in
Atochem had more meritorious claims than the Bar Bea's I and H/
claimant, the CIT rejected plaintiffs request for relief finding "[t]his
is not an exceptional case where clear legal rights were ignored or
actions were taken entirely without color of authority; nor do 'dominant
reasons of justice' exist warranting an award of attorney's fees to
plaintiff." 2 7 Nevertheless, in Atochem the court made it clear that an
administrative proceeding may form the basis of an application to the
278
court for fees under EAJA, subsection (b).
2
9
The CIT in Bonanza considered an award of attorney's fees under
the bad faith exception to the American rule, pursuant to EAJA subsection (b). One claim was based on section 2412(d)(1)(A) for costs
incurred during the judicial proceedings, and one under section
2412(d)(3) for costs incurred during the underlying administrative proceedings. Plaintiff also sought an award under EAJA subsection (b)
which provides the United States "shall be liable for . . . fees and
expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law." 280 The plaintiff in Bonanza sought "to equate
the irregularities during the administrative proceedings, as well as an
alleged attempt by Customs agents to carry out the result thereof...
with bad faith on the part of the [Customs] Service."81 The CIT previously ruled that such relief was necessary and appropriate, and enjoined the Customs Service from taking further action based on the
agency record. 2 2 The court based its bad faith analysis on the Supreme
Court standard enunciated in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
IndustrialLumber Co.m The Supreme Court determined that awards
of attorney's fees have been made when the unsuccessful party has
"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons."
The CIT concluded that the common law standard is broader than the
statutory substantial justification standard and requires analysis of

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 323-324.
Id. at 322.
Bonanza Trucking Corp. v. United States, No. 87-70 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 18, 1987).
Id. slip op. at 10; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1985).
Bonanza Trucking Corp., No. 87-70, slip op. at 10.
Id. slip op. at 11.
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States for use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
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the motives of the unsuccessful litigant.2 After such analysis, the
court concluded that the agency did not seek in bad faith to revoke
the plaintiffs licenses, nor would the court lightly infer bad faith for
purposes of awarding attorney's fees.' The court borrowed from the
Ninth Circuit its characterization of the bad faith exception as applicable "only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of jus-

tice. "26
Thus, the CIT imposes a higher standard under the bad faith
common law exception than under the substantial justification standard
pursuant to EAJA subsection (d)(1)(A). As a result, CIT litigants will
find difficulty in invoking the bad faith exception to receive an award
for attorney's fees in actions in which the court only determines that
agency action was erroneous. The bad faith exception is important
because it imposes no ceiling on the hourly rate of attorneys, whereas
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) limits an award to $75 per hour.
D. Attorneys' Fees Awarded by the Court of InternationalTrade as
a Tool to Control the Legal Process
1. State Law Claims
The CIT also has equitable powers to award attorney's fees on the
basis of relevant state law claims. In United States v. Mizrahie,M the
CIT considered whether a surety seeking indemnification on an import
bond, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1583 (1982), may obtain a writ of
attachment against an indemnitor's real property located in California.m The CIT held it was empowered to issue a writ of attachment affecting property located in California, and that the requirements of
California law, for the issuance of the writ, were met. The court stated
that "[u]nder California law a written agreement of indemnity is fully
enforceable, and may entitle the indemnitor to costs and attorney's
fees incurred in prosecuting the indemnification claim."
The CIT
awarded costs and attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the indemnification claim.

284.
285.
286.
MOORE,
287.
288.
289.

Bonanza Trucking Corp., No. 87-70, slip op. at 11.
Id.
United States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979), quoting J.
W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FED. PRAC. 54.77(d) at 1709-10 (2d ed. 1972).
Mizrahie, 606 F. Supp. 703 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 712.
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Other Court of International Trade Cases Regarding Attorney Fees

In Timken Co. v. Regan,2 ° the plaintiff alleged that the Customs
Service unlawfully liquidated entries subject to an antidumping duty
order and requested damages, attorney's fees and costs. The CIT suspended the count requesting fees pending final resolution of the companion case. The companion case, Timken Co. v. Baldrige291 has not
yet been finally resolved. Conceivably, the court will render a judgment on the motion for attorney's fees in Timken Co. v. Regan at a
later time. The CIT subsequently rejected awards of attorneys' fees
in Harwood Manufacturingv. United States2 2 and in Allen v. Regan.m
The court did not discuss the merits of the requests in either case,
despite both plaintiffs' prevailing on the merits of their underlying
claims.
3.

Court of International Trade Rules Which Permit Recovery of Litigation
Costs and Related Cases

Several of the CIT's rules, in addition to CIT Rule 11, previously
discussed, provide for the recovery of litigation expenses under specific
conditions. CIT Rule 26(a) allows parties to have discovery by "depositions upon oral examination by written questions; written interrogatories, production of documents or things or permission to enter
upon land or other property for inspection and other purposes; physical
and mental examinations; and requests for admission." In order to
achieve an equitable balance, the rule also provides that "[a]ll costs,
charges, and expenses incident to taking depositions shall be borne
by the party making application . . . unless otherwise provided for
by stipulation or by order of the court. ' '2 - The CIT under CIT Rule
37(a)(3), may also award expenses against a party necessitating a
motion for an order compelling discovery. In addition, the CIT could impose litigation expenses against a party for: failure to comply with an
order; failure to admit; failure of a party to attend their own deposition,
serve answers to interrogatories, or respond to a request for inspection; and failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan.2 5

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

552 F. Supp. 47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
No. 82-6-00890 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
7 Ct. Int'l Trade 288 (1984).
607 F. Supp. 133 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
Ct. Int'l Trade R. 26(h).
Ct. Int'l Trade R. 37(b)-(d), (f).
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In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States,2 the CIT considered
awarding expenses and attorney's fees incurred in opposing a motion
for discovery. In Bethlehem, the government's claim for the recovery
of costs was based on the ground that plaintiffs motion was frivolous.
In denying the government's claim, the CIT determined "[w]ithin
reason, attorneys should be free to attempt imaginative or creative
approaches and should even, at times, be free to attempt the impossible."
Further, the government failed to demonstrate bad faith or
vexatiousness on the part of the plaintiff. 2
Two other CIT Rules provide for the recovery of attorney's fees
under appropriate situations. However, the CIT has not considered
claims for the recovery of litigation expenses under these rules. CIT
Rule 16(f) sets forth sanctions incurred, including attorney's fees regarding postassignment conferences, scheduling and management. The
rule provides that "the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because
of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." 9
Further, under CIT Rule 41(e) the court can impose "payments or
costs" for a previously dismissed action "[i]f a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or
including the same claim against the same defendant." These rules
provide the CIT with potentially powerful tools for controlling the
international trade litigation process.
IV.

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES AND PROHIBITION

A.

MANDAMUS

Origin of the Writs

At common law, the writ of mandamus was a command which a
court of law of competent jurisdiction issued to an inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the
performance of a particular duty. That duty was one which resulted
from a legal obligation to act or to refrain from acting. 3° The purpose
of the writ of mandamus, and the corresponding writ of prohibition,

296.
297.
298.
603 F.2d
299.
300.

4 Ct. Int'l Trade 187 (1982).
Id.
See also Christiansburg, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22; United States v. Standard Oil of Cal.,
100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979).
Ct. Int'l Trade R. 16(t).
See generally 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus § 1 (1970).
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is the enforcement of rights already established, rather than the adjudication of rights which are disputed °1 The origin of the writ of
mandamus is traced to the reign of Edward III of England (13271377).=
Because of the great power of the writ, restrictions have long
surrounded its use. The duty to act or to refrain from acting on the
part of the official against whom the writ is sought must be clear and
virtually beyond dispute. In addition, the writ is not intended to function as an alternative to other available means of legal action, including
appeal of an adverse ruling or decision. Thus, the party seeking a
writ of mandamus or prohibition must have no other adequate means
of attaining the desired relief os and must show that the right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable."3 ° Moreover, because
the writ is equitable in origin, issuance of the writ is entrusted to the
discretion of the court to which the petition is addressed.3 5 Thus,
even where the petitioner satisfies the legal requirements for the
issuance of the writ, a court may exercise its equitable discretion to
deny the writ for other reasons.w6
Only in extraordinary circumstances should the court invoke the
writ of mandamus,3 which provides a remedy "only if the plaintiff
has exhausted all of the avenues of relief, and only if the defendant
owes the plaintiff a clear nondiscretionary duty." ° A mandamus is
unavailable to compel one to exercise discretion, but may be used to
compel one to perform a ministerial act.3°
B.

Overview of Mandamus and Prohibitionin the Federal Courts

The panoply of restrictions attendant upon application for these
writs restricts but does not eliminate the utility of the procedure in

301. Id. § 4.
302. See Id. § 2.
303. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
304. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953), quoting United States
ex rel. Bernarden v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
305. Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
306. E.g., American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
307. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980); Kerr, 426 U.S. at 402; see
also Badger v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 657 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). Only exceptional
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpency of power justify the invocation of mandamus.
Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at 35, citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
308. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984).
309. Seaside Realty Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 1481, 1483 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985),
citing Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206 (1930).
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modern federal practice. Although the writs are of common law origin,
they are granted in federal courts pursuant to the All Writs Act,
which states that:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by an Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice
3 10
or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.
The ability of a court to issue a writ is premised upon the potential
frustration of its jurisdiction. Although the power to issue the writ is
premised upon usurpation of, or encroachment upon the jurisdiction
of the issuing court, the writ is granted in many cases which have no
jurisdictional issues present. Thus, in Beacon Theatres v. Westoverll
the Court granted a writ to require the district court to conduct a
jury trial, although this arguably did not pose a jurisdictional issue.
The federal courts of appeals have developed established categories
of cases in which mandamus may be granted, although again the manner in which the courts act in aid of their jurisdiction is difficult to
predict. Courts will regularly consider the grant of the writ in cases
involving orders for change of venue,8 12 and the grant of order that
infringe on first amendment rights. Whether these cases and other
extensions of them are-doctrinally sound, they demonstrate the substantially broadened use of mandamus in the federal courts.
Federal courts also possess jurisdiction of independent mandamus
actions to compel the performance of duties by federal officials.313 Only
in 1962 did the statute confer jurisdiction upon the district courts to
hear such actions, although the District of Columbia Code had previously conferred that power on the District Court for the District of
Columbia. The same traditional restrictions apply to the consideration
of a petition under section 1361. The public official must owe a clear
and specific duty to the petitioner, and the petitioner must lack any
other useful remedy save the mandamus action.314 Other courts have
spoken of a "peremptory duty" on the part of the federal defendant

310. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1949).
311. 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959).
312. E.g., In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979) (denial of motions
for refusal); Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978).
313. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962).
314. E.g., Ramirez v. Weinburger, 363 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd, 415 U.S. 970
(1974).
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which is clear and plainly defined. 3 5 Regardless of the precise formulation of the test for relief, the burden upon the petitioner is a difficult
one.
C.

Mandamus and Prohibitionin the Court of InternationalTrade

In order to keep pace with the "increasing complexities of modern
day international trade litigation316 Congress enacted the Customs
Court Act of 1980, abolishing the Customs Court and creating the
CIT. Prior to the passage of this legislation, the Customs Court was
not empowered to issue money judgments, nor could it provide equitable relief 3 '7 In addition, much valid litigation was subject to dismissal
in federal district courts for a perceived lack of subject matter juris3 s
diction. 1
Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980319 granted jurisdiction to the CIT of any civil action arising out of the federal statutes
governing import- transactions.' In additio1 "o this general grant of
jurisdiction, Congress in section 1585 granted the CIT "all the powers
in law and equity" possessed by a federal district court. Under section
1585, the CIT has authority to afford relief appropriate to the case
before it, including, but not limited to, a money judgment, a writ of
mandamus or injunctive relief. 2 ' Section 1585 was not a grant of additional jurisdiction; rather, it merely confirmed the court's power to
3
grant injunctive relief.
In addition to sections 1581 and 1585, Congress also added section
301, which struck the former provisions of chapter 169, title 28 of the
United States Code, and substituted seventeen new provisions governing court procedure in the newly formed CIT. One, section 2643,
provided the various types of relief that could be ordered by the
CIT.3 2 In its report on the statute, the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives stated:

315.
316.

Save the Dunes Council v. Alexander, 584 F.2d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1978).
H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEWS 3730.

317. Id.
318. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1980).
320. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 316, at 19.
321. Id. at 21.
322. See Manufacture De Machines Du Haut-Rhis v. Von Raab, 569 F. Supp 877 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983).
323. H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980).
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Subsection (c)(1) [of 28 U.S.C. § 2643] is a general grant of
authority for the Court of International Trade to order any
form of relief that it deems appropriate under the circumstances. It is the Committee's intent that this authorization by deemed to grant the Court of International Trade
remedial powers co-extensive with those of a federal district
court. This provision makes it clear that the court may issue
declaratory judgments, writs of prohibition and mandamus,
orders of remand, and preliminary or permanent injunctive
relief .... 324
As the CIT interpreted the congressional mandate, a perceived
conflict has emerged between the court's status as a coequal federal
district court, as was intended by 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (and § 1585), and
the constraints of the court's jurisdictional mandate embodied in sections 1581-1585. In order for the CIT to exercise its powers pursuant
to section 2643, it must, of course, first find jurisdiction under section
1581.
It is well-settled that the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating
that jurisdiction exists when it is challenged. 325 Basically, for the CIT
to have jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the cause of action
arises out of customs or international trade law, although the court
does not have jurisdiction over all international trade disputes. 32 Thus,
in customs matters, the court has opined that in order for it to have
jurisdiction, "it is necessary that the gravamen of the complaint be
determined . . . [and if] the thrust of the grievance alleged and the
relief sought by the plaintiff relates to the regulations promulgated
by customs and their administration and enforcement." 32
Many litigants allege jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i), which
Congress intended as "a plenary grant of residual jurisdiction to [the
CIT] over international trade litigation." 3? The Report of the House
Judiciary Committee on the Customs Courts Act of 1980 states clearly
the policy goals behind this provision:
The purpose of this broad jurisdictional grant is to eliminate
the confusion which currently exists as to the demarcation

324. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3772-73 (bracketed material added).
325. United States v. Biehl, 539 F. Supp. 1218 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
326. Id.
327. Schaper Mfg. Co. v. Regan, 566 F. Supp. 894, 896 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
328. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd,
761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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between the jurisdiction of the district courts and the Court
of International Trade. This provision makes it clear that all
the suits of the type specified are properly commenced only
in the Court of International Trade. The Committee has
included this provision in the legislation to eliminate much
of the difficulty experienced by international trade litigants
who have in the past commenced suits in the district courts
only to have these suits dismissed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction. The grant of jurisdiction in subsection (i) will
insure that these suits will be heard on their merits. 329
The CIT has frequently grappled with the relationship between
the extent of its jurisdiction under section 1581(i) and its power to
order any form of equitable relief it deems appropriate. In National
Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker-3 ° [Corn Growers 1], plaintiffs moved
for a preliminary injunction ordering the Commissioner of Customs
to require the posting of bonds and to delay liquidation with respect
to entries of certain fuel ethanol blends.-' The government crossmoved to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 332 Concerning
the dispute surrounding jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i), the
court stated:
Although plaintiffs may not use section 1581(i) to create a
new cause of action, it is clear that this Court should exercise
jurisdiction under section 1581(i) when the usual route
through administrative action would result in a "manifestly
inadequate" remedy . . . In this case plaintiffs may well
have been foreclosed from obtaining any judicial remedy had
they pursued a protest to Customs. 333
Although the court denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in Corn Growers I, it deemed it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction
under section 1581(i) "for the limited purpose of hearing plaintiffs'
application for the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction.

329. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 316, at 47.
330. No. 85-98 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Corn Growers I].
331. Id. slip op. at 1-2.
332. Id.
333. Id. slip op. at 5-6, citing Luggage & Leather Goods Mfgs. of Am., Inc. v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners'
Ass'n v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade), affd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
334. Corn Growers I, slip op. at 6.
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In National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker35 [Corn Growers II],
the parties returned to the court with renewed requests for the same
relief, prompting another discussion of the interrelationship between
section 1581(i) and the court's ability to grant extraordinary remedies.
The court stated:
A review of subsections (a) through (h) of 28 U.S.C. § 1581
leads to the conclusion that jurisdiction for this court's power
to grant declaratory or mandamus relief in a manner co-extensive with that of a district court in an action such as this
36
must be based on subsection (i).
The court in Corn Growers H cited the discussion of the same
issue by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in United States
v. Uniroyal, Inc.- 7 In Uniroyal, the court reversed the CIT's denial
of the government's motion to dismiss for want of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that subsection (i) was not the appropriate jurisdictional basis for the importer's concern about a Customs Service
practice. For the majority, Judge Baldwin held that Congress did not
intend that subsection (i) be "used generally to bypass administrative
review by meaningful protest." In a concurring opinion, Judge Nies
noted:
Appellee's argument that as a matter of convenience and
efficiency it should be allowed to proceed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i) . .. is not... persuasive. Section 1581(i) provides
jurisdiction "in addition to the jurisdiction conferred ... by
section 1581 (a)-(h)" and may not be construed as an all
embracing alternative remedy to those sections. In my view
the broad subject matter jurisdiciton of the court under
1581(i) may be invoked only when no other remedy is available or the remedies provided under other provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1581 are manifestly inadequate.-9
The jurisdictional criteria set forth in Judge Nies' concurring opinion
thus effectively mirror the prerequisites which apply to the writ of
mandamus. The court has since adopted the position articulated by
Judge Nies.

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

623 F. Supp. 1262 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) [hereinafter Corn Growers II].
Id. at 1269.
687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 475 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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The CIT, consistent with the traditional view that writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies to be granted only
when no other remedy is available, has adopted a strict view of the
basis for such relief. In fact, in no case in which mandamus was
specifically requested has the court to date granted the writ.
The court has adopted rationales which are consistent with those
applied by other federal courts for denial of the writ. The court has,
for example, held that the availability of alternative remedies precludes
the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In UST, Inc. v. United States,3°
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the government to
expedite the administrative review of an antidumping duty order. As
the Department of Commerce failed to complete the reviews within
twelve months allotted by statute, plaintiff argued that commerce was
in violation of its duty under the statute as well as its own regulations.
Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus "to compel the ITA to complete
the administrative review as set out in the statute and otherwise
proceed as required by law." 34' At oral argument, the government
proposed a schedule for completion of the various section 751 reviews
at issue . 342 The court took the government's proposed schedule into
account, while expressing "frustration" at ITA's inability to explain
its delays in completing the administrative review process . 343 The court
stated that the agency must act within a "reasonable time," despite
the fact that the statutory timetable has been held to be directory
and not mandatory. With regard to the requested writ of mandamus,
the court held: "Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be
employed only when there is no meaningful alternative and because
defendant's proposed schedule appears to be such an alternative, the
[c]ourt will not decide at this point whether or not to issue a writ of
mandamus."- Although declining to issue a writ of mandamus, the
court required the parties to file monthly status reports with the court
and to adhere to the government's proposed schedule. Thus, the court
was able to find a "meaningful alternative" to the compulsory writ,
and declined to grant extrordinary relief.
Similarly, in PPG Industries v. United States, 45 the court determined that there was a "meaningful alternative" to mandamus, and

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

648 F. Supp. 1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
525 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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thus declined to issue the writ. In PPG Industries, plaintiff requested
a disclosure conference in conjunction with a section 751 review, as
statutorily provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d). The government responded that such a conference was not unnecessary. PPG Industries
sued, requesting that a writ of mandamus be issued to compel the
ITA to hold a disclosure conference as requested. PPG Industries
asserted that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to require the
ITA to hold the requested hearing, lest ITA make its determination
with PPG Industries having had the opportunity to present its view,
346
as provided by the Commerce regulations.
The government claimed that its decision not to hold a disclosure
hearing was discretionary, and that judicial review of that decision
could be entertained only in the context of a complete review of the
complete section 751 review. 3u7 The court agreed with the government,
holding that "all matters having to do with the final determination
' '3
should be reviewed at the same time, and not in piecemeal fashion. 48
Further, the court noted that PPG Industries may have found the
final determinations of the ITA satisfactory, in which case the refusal
to grant a disclosure conference would constitute error without injury. 49 However, if PPG were to appeal ITA's final determination in
the annual review, that would be a proper time to review all interlocutory decisions, including the refusal of PPG's request for a disclosure
conference.Finally, the court held that mandamus was an inappropriate remedy,
since PPG brought its cause of action prematurely. Noting that a mandamus is available "only in extraordinary circumstances and when no
meaningful alternatives are available, '351 the court reasoned that a
meaningful alternative legal remedy was available in this case: PPG
Industries could appeal the final determination of the section 751 review. 352
While often finding that the existence of alternative remedies rules
out the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the CIT has twice been
presented with a hypothetical situation in which the issuance of a writ
of mandamus might be appropriate. In Badger-Powhatan (Div. of

346. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.53(d) (1980).
347. 525 F. Supp. at 884.
348. Id. at 885.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. citing Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322,
1325 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
352. 525 F. Supp. at 885.
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Figgie Int'l) v. United States,m a United States producer of brass
fire protection products sought a writ of mandamus to compel Commerce to amend its antidumping order to include certain products
determined by Commerce to be within the class or kind of foreign
merchandise investigated. Commerce discovered that the products in
the class were sold at less than fair value, although the ITC [International Trade Commission] found zero dumping margins, based on Commerce's confidential work papers. Thus, Commerce concluded that the
products did not cause material injury to the domestic industry.- The
government responded that an antidumping duty order could not be
entered against merchandise which was not causing material injury
to a domestic industry and argued that mandamus should not be issued
where alternative grounds for relief exist.The CIT denied plaintiffs application for a writ of mandamus,
reasoning that plaintiffs proper avenue for relief in this case was an
appeal of ITA's final determination under section 516(A) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a).3 The court stated:
To grant the requested writ of mandamus in this instance
would further serve to grant the ultimate relief available
had plaintiff chose [sic] to bring an action under section
1516a. If plaintiffs request is framed as an issue of statutory
construction, as a question of law, the appropriate avenue of
recourse is similarly a section 1516a action. Had the ITA
refused to issue the antidumping orderfollowing the affirmative determinations, a mandamus action to compel the per7
formance of a ministerialact would have been appropriate.The CIT has spoken in other cases of the possibility of seeking a
writ of mandamus, although the plaintiff sought relief from agency
action on other grounds. In Nissan Motor Corp. v. United States,the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ITA from
conducting an administrative review and requiring the submission of

353. 608 F. Supp. 653 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
354. Id. at 654.
355. Id.
356. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1984).
357. Supra note 353, at 658 (emphasis added). See also Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. United
States, 507 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 n.19 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), affd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("Indeed if by some chance the consequences of the less than fair value and injury determinations
were not enforced, it would be the petitioner who would have a traditional mandamus action
to compel the appropriate official to perform ministerial acts."). Id.
358. 651 F. Supp. 1450 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
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questionnaire responses therein. The situation was analogous to that
presented in USTh9 in that the administrative review in question was
far behind schedule. The court adopted an approach similar to that
adopted in UST, requiring the ITA to supply a schedule for completion
of the administrative reviews and to adhere to it. On this basis, the
court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the action. Although the court did not address the possibility of mandamus, should
the agency fail to adhere to its schedule for completion of the reviews,
presumably a mandamus action would lie if the agency were unable
to meet the deadlines in its own schedule. The court thus demonstrated
a willingness to fashion a flexible remedy rather than ruling upon the
plaintiffs request for extraordinary relief.
As the Badger-Powhatanand Royal Business Machines cases indicate, the court would issue a writ of mandamus in the unlikely event
that ITA refused to issue an antidumping duty order. A mandamus
issued to compel publication of the order itself, after the final determination of sales at less than fair value and the ITC's injury determination, would constitute a "ministerial act," and not a matter of discretion. Mandamus is available only "to stimulate action pursuant to some
legal duty, and not to cause the respondent to undo action already
taken, or to correct or revise such action, however, erroneous it may
have been."s°
As mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal, the
situations in which it may properly issue are necessarily quite limited.
Further, since mandamus may not be used to compel the exercise of
discretion,m' and since many agency determinations can be characterized as essentially discretionary statutory interpretations, application for relief in the nature of mandamus is doubtful when the request
challenges an agency's interpretation of a statute.3
The holdings of the CIT are consistent with those of other federal
courts in cases where a duty on the part of a government official is
alleged. In Azurin v. United States,m plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction and writ of mandamus to compel the Customs Service to

359. 648 F. Supp. 1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
360. 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus § 9 (1970).
361. Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206 (1930); Seaside Realty Corp. v. United States,
607 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
362. See Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925) ("Under some
statutes, the discretion extends to a final construction by the officer of the statute he is executing.
No court in such a case can control by mandamus his interpretation, even if he may think it
erroneous.").
363. 632 F. Supp. 30 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
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release certain documents in its possession. The CIT, upon examination
of the applicable regulations and plaintiffs' due process claim, concluded
that there was no basis for the alleged duty to return the documents.36
In contrast to the prevailing stringent standard under 28 U.S.C. §
1361, plaintiffs in Azurin did not even produce a colorable claim of
duty on the part of Customs officials.8 65
While consistent with the practice of other federal courts, the practice of the CIT with regard to writs of mandamus and prohibition
suggests an emerging flexibility which augurs well for the effective
use of these judicial tools in the future. The court has demonstrated
a willingness to fashion sua sponte alternative remedies which either
delay or obviate the need for extraordinary relief. Because of the
exhaustive scheme of judicial review which forms the jurisdictional
base for the CIT's actions, the court has not yet had occasion to
develop that classic aspect of writs of mandamus and prohibition whose
purpose is to protect the court's jurisdiction. Where other federal
courts must be concerned with changes of venue and other devices
which may frustrate their jurisdiction, the CIT is less burdened by
such concerns. As a court of limited, albeit, national jurisdiction, its
use of writs of mandamus and prohibition is focused more upon compelling, where necessary, the performance of statutorily mandated
duties of the agencies whose determinations are subject to its review.
V.

A.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

DeclaratoryJudgments in the Federal Courts

"The declaratory judgment action is an elastic instrumentality for
the better administration of justice. '"- "Actions for declaratory judgments represent a comparatively recent development in American
jurisprudence. ' '1 7 "The declaratory judgment remedy allows parties
to receive speedy adjudication of their rights."3 6sDeclaratory judgment

364.

Id. at 34.

365. See also Seaside Realty Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985) (mandamus can be used to compel performance of ministerial act).
366. W. Anderson, Actions for DeclaratoryJudgments:A Treatise on the Pleading,Practice and Trial of an Action for a DeclaratoryJudgement, From its Inception to its Conclusion,

1 (1940).
367. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2751, at 568. "[T]he remedy as it is
now known has been recognized in the United States only since 1919 when legislatures began
to adopt statutes similar to those still in effect authorizing the declaratory judgement." Id. at
§ 2752, at 571.
368. Note, Federal JurisdictionOver DeclaratoryJudgement Suits - Federal Preemtion
of State Law, 1986 U. ILL. L.F. 127, 142.
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plaintiffs can receive early adjudication of their rights without waiting
for an adverse party to file suit. Professor Borchard has indicated the
six specific advantages of the declaratory judgement; the remedy:
(1) provides a speedy and inexpensive method to adjudicate
legal disputes; (2) allows courts to interpret statutes without
requiring prior breach; (3) relieves parties from acting upon
their own interpretations of their rights, at their peril, as a
precondition of judicial action; (4) removes uncertainty and
insecurity from legal relations; (5) enables those persons acting in a fiduciary capacity to obtain authoritative guidance
and protection against liability in trust administration; and
(6) enables a claimant to choose a mild but adequate form
of relief by declaration in place of drastic and harsh coercion
which the claimant does not desire or need.- 9
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 abd 2202. Under section 2201, the courts, upon the filing of
an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking such declaration (except with
respect to certain federal taxes and drug patents), whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Further, such declaration has the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and is reviewable as
such. The brevity of section 2202 is astonishing, considering its potential
impact on the federal courts' ability to grant extraordinary legal remedies. Section 2202 provides in toto "[f]urther necessary or proper
relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted,
after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose
rights have been determined by such judgment.' ' 370
The procedure for obtaining a declaratoryjudgment pursuant to
section 2201 is stated in FRCP Rule 57 which provides that the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment shall be in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the right to trial by
jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner
provided in FRCP Rules 38 and 39. "The existence of another adequate
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate." Further, federal courts are authorized to
order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment.371 A

369. Id. at 142 n.96, citing E.
1941).
370.
371.

BORCHARD DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS

280-89 (2d ed.

28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1948).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.
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declaratory judgment action that is subject to372the Federal Rules is
neither legal nor equitable; it is a civil action.

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was originally enacted in
1934 as section 274 of the Judicial Code of 1911. 373 "In enacting the
Declaratory Judgments Act in 1934, Congress determined that the
remedy of declaratory judgment should be available to litigants in the
courts of the United States. ' ' 374 Congress has expressly stated that:

The "declaratory judgment" is a useful procedure in determining jural rights, obligations, and privileges. It confers
upon the courts the power to exercise in certain instances
preventive relief. It enables parties who are uncertain of
their legal rights and who are prejudiced by the adverse
claims of others to invoke the aid of the courts for the determination of their rights before any injury has been done. It
can also save tedious and costly litigation by ascertaining at
the outset of a case the controlling fact or law involved, thus
enabling the court to conclude
the litigation or confine it to
375
more precise limitations.

In 1935, the Act was amended to expressly prohibit the rendition of
declaratory judgments with respect to federal taxes. 376 The judicial

code Revision of 1948 carried forward the Declaratory Judgment Act,
without material change, as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. 377 In 1976, section

2201 was amended to except from the exclusion of suits for declaratory
judgments concerning certain federal taxes.3

78

In 1978, a further

372. 6A J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.06,
at 57-25 (1986) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. In addition, the majority of states
have adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act; almost all the states now provide some
form of declaratory relief. Id. at 57.02(1), at 57-54. The Uniform Act is much more explicit
and detailed than the Federal Declaratory Judgement Act, and includes sections on the scope
of the remedy, power to construe, time relating to breach, executor provisions, nonexclusivity
of other remedies, court discretion, supplemental relief, jury trials, costs, parties liberal construction, words construed, provisions severable, and uniformity of interpretation. Id. at 57-5 to
57-8. The Uniform Act together with state jurisprudential experience provides the federal courts
with great assistance in their interpretation of the federal act. Id. at 57-6.
373. 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1940). 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supranote 372, 57.02(2),
at 57-8.
374. S. REP. No. 1916, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEWS 3389.
375. Id.
376. 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372, 57.02(2), at 57-8.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 57-9.
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amendment was implemented to except proceedings under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 505, 1106 of Title 11. Subsection (b) was added in 1984 to provide
certain limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents
pertaining to section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.3 79 Section 2202, also enacted in 1934, was also based on the second
paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1940). The provision in section 400, that
the court shall require adverse parties whose rights are adjudicated
to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith, was
omitted as unnecessary and covered by the revised section. Provisions
relating to the submission of interrogatories to a jury were omitted
as covered by FRCP Rule 49.
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes federal courts, in cases
within their jurisdiction, to grant litigants approximately the same
declaratory relief previously administered by a majority of the state
courts.-" "The Act is remedial and procedural in nature; creates no
substantive rights or duties; and neither augments nor diminishes
federal jurisdiction." 38l The declaratory judgment remedy provides "a
means by which rights and obligations may be adjudicated in cases
involving an actual controversy that has not reached the stage at
which either party may seek a coercive remedy and in cases in which
a party who could sue for coercive relief has not yet done so. '
Although the jurisdiction of the courts is not expanded and requests
for declaratory judgments may be heard only in cases that otherwise
are within their jurisdiction, the new remedy enlarges the judicial
process and makes it more flexible by putting a new implement at
the disposal of the courts. 31 The uniqueness of the declaratory remedy
lies in its potential prophylactic character, and in the fact that it is
an all-purpose writ.1 4
The equity form of declaratory judgments was more flexible than
the traditional common law forms of action, which were designed to
give redress for wrongs already committed.- "While redressing actual

379. Id.
380. Id. 57.005, at 57-21.
381. Id. at 57-21, 57-22.
382. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2751, at 569. See Halkin v. Helms,
690 F.2d 977, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The essence of the declaratory judgment remedy is
affording a form of relief, on the basis of acts either completed or threatened, that will operate
to adjust the rights of the parties in cases in which the award of a prospective coercive judgment
would, for any number of reasons be inappropriate."). Id. at 1007.
383. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2751, at 569.
384. 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372, 57.05, at 57-22.
385. Id.
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wrongs, equity often made adjudications before any wrong had been
committed or liability incurred."'3 Neither the common law nor equity
developed, however, to the point that a litigant could always obtain
an adjudication as to his rights or liabilities, although the subject-mat87
ter was justiciable and an adjudication would serve a useful purpose.
"The Declaratory Judgment Act merely introduced additional remedies." Thus, the declaratory judgment is an all-purpose remedy designed to permit an adjudication whenever the court has jurisdiction,
there is an actual case or controversy, and an adjudication would serve
a useful purpose. 89
The constitutional parameters pertaining to declaratory judgments
have been established by the Supreme Court. "The great deterrent
to the early spread of declaratory judgment statutes in this country
was the confusion that existed between declaratory judgments and
advisory opinions, and the consequent constitutional doubts. ' ' 390 The
Supreme Court, in 1927 in Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,39, held
that a state declaratory judgment was in effect an advisory opinion
and in conflict with article III "case" or "controversy" requirement.
In 1933, the Supreme Court in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,392
reversed its position and held that review of an action brought under
a state declaratory judgment statute was within the judicial power.
The Court also recognized that if there were an actual controversy between litigants, the constitutional requisites of jurisdiction are met
39
even though the judgment is declaratory and cannot be executed. 3
The constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act is currently
beyond serious question.- 4 The federal statute authorizing declaratory
judgments was upheld by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life Insurance
v. Haworth.395 The Court realized in Aetna that the application of the
Act was restricted to "cases of actual controversy." 3- Further, the
constitutional right to a jury trial is not impaired by the Act. 397 "The

386.
387.
388.
1937).
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id. at 57-23.
Id., citing E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.
6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372, 57.05, at 57-24.
Id. at 57.03, at 57-17.
273 U.S. 70, 74 (1927).
288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2753, at 574.
6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372, 57.11, at 57-79.
300 U.S. 227 (1937); 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2752, at 574.
Id.; see also 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372,
57.04, at 57-20.
Id.
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Act created a new procedural remedy, but it did not broaden the
398
courts' jurisdiction nor alter the concept of justifiability." '
The Declaratory Judgment Act enlarges the range of remedies
available in federal court by affording the courts a new noncoercive
remedy, but the Act did not expand subject matter jurisdiction. 399
Federal declaratory judgment suits present the courts with difficult
questions in applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. 4° 0 In Skelly Oil
v. Phillips Petroleum,401 the Supreme Court held that a federal court

may exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action only if the plaintiffs
complaint in a hypothetical suit, absent the declaratory remedy, would
present a substantial federal question. Thus, federal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over declaratory complaint through a mechanical
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule if a complaint raises any
federal claim.402 The Supreme Court, in Public Service Commission
v. Wycoff Co.,4°3 reiterated the policy established in Skelly Oil: the

Court will not allow parties to enlarge federal question jurisdiction
4
with declaratory judgment actions.'0

The Declaratory Judgment Act "provides that 'any interested
party' may seek the declaration and this makes applicable to declaratory actions the general law. ' ' 45 It applies only in "a case of actual

controversy" as set forth under article III, section 2, of the United
6
States Constitution.40

According to the Supreme Court, in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union,4 7 each issue with respect to which a plaintiff
398. Id. at 57.11, at 57-79, citing Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. MeAdory, 325 U.S.
450 (1945); Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
399. Note, supra note 368, at 143. See also, Hughes Bechtol, Inc. v. West Va. Bd. of
Regents, 527 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 737 F.2d 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1018 (1984).
400. Note, supra note 368, at 143.
401. 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950).
402. Note, supra note 368, at 143; Note, The Expanded FederalQuestion: On the "Independent Viability" of Declaratory Claims, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 814 (1982).
403. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
404. Note, supra note 368, at 147. See also Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S.
67, 71 n. 1 (1983) (section 2201 creates a remedy, not legal rights or subject matter jurisdiction).
405. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2257, at 580-81. See also River Park
Tenants Ass'n v. 3600 Venture, 534 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
406. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2757, at 578, citing Aetna Life Ins.,
300 U.S. 227 (1937); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)
("Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgement."). See also
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
407. 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979), citing Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945).
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requests declaratory relief should be examined to determine whether
it presents "a real, substantial controversy between parties having
adverse legal interests, [and is] a dispute definite and concrete, not
hypothetical or abstract." A case or controversy must exist at all
stages of an action and cannot be predicated on a speculative future
event. 40 An ad hoc basis is used to determine whether particular facts
are sufficiently immediate and real to make an actual controversy. 4 9
Generally, "[t]here is little difficulty in finding an actual controversy
if all of the facts that are alleged to create liability already have
occurred. '410 It is clear, moreover, that a declaratory judgment is
proper in some cases even though future developments may determine
whether a controversy ever ripens.41
Courts, however, should not "express legal opinions on academic
theoreticals which might never come to pass.' 412 "Courts have declined
to hear cases seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality
of a particular statute or ordinance when plaintiff has not shown that
there is an immediate threat that the statute will be enforced against
him. '' 41s Conversely, the federal courts "have not hesitated to issue a
declaration if one or both parties have taken steps or pursued a course
of conduct which will result in imminent and inevitable litigation, provided the issue is not settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration.,,414

In order to have an actual controversy the case must be ripe, but
the matter must not be moot. 4 5 Professor Borchard has indicated the
essential characteristics of moot cases include a lack of controversy
and the decision cannot definitely affect existing legal relations.416
For a declaratory judgment to be an apt remedy, it must settle
the controversy. "When declaratory relief will not be effective in settling the controversy, the court may decline to grant it. "417 "In using

408.

6A

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,

supra note 372,

57.11, at 57-90, citing Kidwell

ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
409. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2757, at 585.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 586.
412. Id. at 587, citing American Cas. Fidelity v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 1960); Mayhew v. Krug, 98 F. Supp. 338 (D.D.C.
1951).
413. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2757, at 587.
414. Id. at 594, citing Bruhn v. STP Corp., 312 F. Supp. 903, 906 (1970); Wembley, Inc.
v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1963).
415. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2757, at 601-02.

416.

E.

BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS,

417.

6A

MOORE'S

82-84 (2d ed. 1941).

FEDERAL PRACTICE supra note 372,
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the term 'settling the controversy,' courts do not require that the
broader controversy, i.e., the manifold and multifarious issues and
legal relationships and interrelationships of the entire dispute, be put
at rest by the declaratory remedy. '418 In a declaratory action, the
controversy at issue must itself be an autonomous and independent
dispute which involves questions of great importance to the interested
parties. 419 Thus, the declaratory action should be dismissed if it is
impossible to separate the issues in such a way that an important,
autonomous part of the dispute would be effectively settled by declaratory relief.420 A declaratory judgment must serve a useful purpose. 421 Accordingly, a judgment does not serve a useful purpose in
settling the controversy where plaintiff's rights are inextricably interwoven with the rights of others who are not in privity to the declaratory action. "Thus in the absence of interested parties, a court may
refuse to entertain a declaratory action, even though the absent, interested parties have not been found to be necessary or indispensable." 422 •
A declaratoryjudgment may be granted even where there is another
23 FRCP Rule 57 provides that the exiseffective remedy available.4
tence of "another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." FRCP Rule 57
and "the additional provision that a declaratory judgment may be
granted 'whether or not further relief is or could be prayed' was put
into the rule to establish beyond doubt that 'declaratory relief is alternative or cumulative and not exclusive or extraordinary.' '' 4 The federal courts may, however, in the exercise of discretion in determining
whether to grant a declaratory judgment properly refuse to give a
judgment if the alternative remedy is better or more effective. 42- "A
declaratory action is not barred, even though cumulative relief for the
same wrong must be sought in a separate action." 6 The same principles control where there is a pending action raising some of the questions posed by the declaratory action.42 7 "The pendency of another suit

418.
added).
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

427.

6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372,

57.08[E], at 57-48 (emphasis

Id.
Id. at 57-49.
Id. at 57-50, citing Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1942).
Id. at 57-49.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2758, at 620.
Id. at 621.
6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 372, 57.07, at 57-27.
10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2758, at 624.
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does not bar declaratory relief, if the issues in the declaratory action
will not necessarily be determined in the other suit."' 4 - However,

where the other suit will resolve the parties' controversy, the declaratory action may be dismissed or stayed.4 2
Granting declaratoryjudgments under the DeclaratoryJudgment
Act is within the federal court's discretion. "The discretionary power
of the courts was implied from the fact that the Act merely conferred
power to grant a remedy without prescribing the conditions under
which it is to be granted. "4 The well settled rule is that great deference is given to the trial court's discretion of whether to grant a
declaratory judgment. 1 The courts should exercise their discretion
liberally to further the purposes of the Act. 4 2 The courts within their

discretion can refuse jurisdiction where the alternative remedy is bet4
ter or more effective.

3

Courts often employ Professor Borchard'sformulation that "[t]he
two principal criteria guiding the policy in fa-or of rendering declaratory judgments are (1) when the judgment wilt serve a useful purpose
in clarifying and settling the relations in issue, and (2) when it will
terminate and afford relieffrom the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.'"- The test has been restated
as "whether the issuance of a declaratory judgment will effectively
solve the problem whether it will serve a useful purpose, and whether
or not the other remedy is more effective or efficient. '" Where the

428. Id. at 625-26.
429. Id. at 627, citing International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.
1980); Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 446 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
430. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2759, at 645.
431. Id. at 645 n.4, citing Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 126 (1968); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942), reh'g denied,
317 U.S. 704 (1942); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Cass County v. United States, 570 F.2d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 1978); Tamari v. Bache & Co.
(Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977).

432.

6A

MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,

supra note 372,

57.08[2], at 57-37, citing Broad-

view Chem. Co. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973) (district courts have broad
discretion to mold their decrees to fit the circumstances of the particular case).
433. Id. at 57-40. See also MacMillan-Bloedel, Inc., v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, 558
F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
434. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2759, at 647-8, citing E. BORCHARD,
supra note 416, at 229 (emphasis added).
435. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2758, at 627-30, citing Western v.
McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Md. 1962). See also Smith v. Metropolitan Property &
Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980).
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judgment sought would not settle the litigants' controversy, the courts
6
will likely deny declaratory relief.
Factors that courts have considered as criteriafor the denial of
declaratoryjudgment include the inconvenience and burden to litigants
who live at a distance and the inequitable conduct of the party seeking
the declaration. 3 7 Further, federal courts "will refuse to entertain a
declaratory judgment action if the controversy has been effectively
settled by the decision of some other tribunal or if otherwise there is
no need for the declaration. '"4
Federal courts also generally refrain from using declaratory judgments to resolve important questions of public law.- 9 And, "[d]eclaratory relief ordinarily should not be granted if a special statutory proceeding has been provided for the determination of particular questions. "4
Declaratory relief will be denied if it would confuse rather than
clarify the parties' legal relations and result in piecemeal litigation.4
However, discretion to deny declaratory relief is not absolute, since
the courts cannot refuse to entertain a declaratory judgment action
as a matter of whim or personal disinclination. 42 "If a case can be
settled most expeditiously in the federal court, that court should exercise its jurisdiction." 3 The fact that future actions involving identical
issues might be instituted is not sufficient reason to deny declaratory
relief.4- "Much of the confusion relative to the exercise of judicial
436. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2758, at 648. See Panama Processes
S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 362 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1974).
Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides an administrative declaratory order
that parallels the traditional declaratory judgment. See Powell, Sinners, Supplicants, and
Samaritans:Agency Advice Giving in Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 63 N.C.L. REV. 339-74 (1985); Powell, Administratively Declaring Order: Some Specific
Applications of the Administrative Procedures Act's Declaratory Order Process, 64 N.C.L.
REV. 277-301 (1986).
437. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2759, at 651.
438. Id. at 652-53.
439. Id. at 654.
440. Id. at 642.
441. Higginbotham & Riddle, DeclaratoryJudgments, 8 ALI ABA Course Mat. Judgments
14 (June 1986), citing Harris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 569 F.2d 850, 852 (5th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. MidContinent Gas Co., 518 F.2d
292 (10th Cir. 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536 (3d Cir. 1974); Hogan v. Lukhard,
351 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Va. 1972).
442. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2759, at 655-56, citing Public Affairs
Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962); Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans, 657 F.2d
746 (5th Cir. 1981).
443. 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2759, at 657-58.

444.

6A

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

supra note 372,
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discretion with respect to declaratory actions has resulted from a
failure at times to distinguish between jurisdiction and the discretion' 5
ary exercise thereof.""
The relationship between declaratoryjudgments and injunctions.
There may be advantages in seeking a declaratory judgment versus
an injunction." 6 A court may grant a declaratory judgment prior to
the time a damage award or injunctive relief would be available, as
well as when the plaintiff anticipates a claim for damages or injunctive
relief would be available, as well as when the plaintiff anticipates a
7
claim for damages or injunctive relief being asserted against him.Declaratory judgments also serve as an alternative to the "strong
medicine" of an injunction. 44 Alternatively, declaratory and injunctive
relief can be sought simultaneously. -9
B.

Declaratory Judgments in the Court of InternationalTrade

The CIT has been granted statutory authority to order declaratory
judgments. "The Court of International Trade shall possess all the
powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district
court of the United States."' 450 As the House Committee on the
Judiciary stated:
[S]ubsection (c)(1) is a general grant of authority for the
Court of International Trade to order any form of relief that
it deems appropriate under the circumstances [and] [i]t is
the Committee's intent that this authorization be deemed to
grant the Court of International Trade remedial451powers coextensive with those of a federal district court.

445. Id. at V 57.08(1), at 57-32.
446. See discussion of injunctions presented at the Second and Third Annual Judicial Conferences of the United States Court of International Trade.
447. Higginbotham & Riddle, supra note 441, at 7, 9, citing Superior Oil Co. v. Pioneer
Corp., 706 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1983); Travelers Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 536.
448. Higginbothan & Riddle, supra note 441, at 10, citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 389 F. Supp. 836, 845-46 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
449. See 10A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2758, at 620.
450. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1980). See Royal Bus. Machs. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1007,
1008 n.3 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
451. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980); Wear Me Apparel Corp. v.
United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 818 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). See also United States v. Mizrahie,
606 F. Supp. 703, 707 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp.
216, 219 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980); Sanho Collections, Ltd. v. Chasen, 505 F. Supp. 204, 208 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980).
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Moreover, the CIT, with certain exceptions, in addition to the
orders specified in subsections (a) and (b) of 28 U.S.C. § 2643, "may
order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action,
including, but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand
injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition. '' 452 Thus, the CIT,
with certain limitations, is expressly empowered to grant declaratory
relief coextensive with the remedial powers of the federal district
courts.
The procedurefor obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2201 in the CIT is set forth in CIT Rule 57, which is
essentially identical to FRCP Rule 57. CIT Rule 57 provides the
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, specifying that it shall be in accordance with the CIT's Rules and
"the right to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed by [CIT] Rules 38 and 39.''45 "The
existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.

' 4-

Further,

under Rule 57 "[t]he court may order a speedy hearing of an action
for declaratory judgment. '"-

The principles employed by the CIT in determining whether or not
to order declaratory relief are identical to those utilized by the other
federal courts. For example, the Court in Corn Growers H, cited the
Supreme Court's rule: "the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all [the] circumstances, show that there is substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment."456
452. See Budd Co., Ry. Div. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 175, 176 (1981).
453. Jury trials in the Court of International Trade are somewhat unusual. CIT Rule 38
clarifies that the right of trial by jury is preserved in accordance with the United States
Constitution. CIT Rule 39 sets forth the rules for a trial by jury or by the court, use of an
advisory jury, and trial by consent.
454. Ct. Int'l Trade R. 57.
455. The Court of International Trade has indicated that its rules will be strictly enforced.
A motion for a declaratory judgment which is untimely will be stricken by the court. 718 Fifth
Ave. Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 6 (1984) (where plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment without allowing defendant time to answer in violation of Rule 57; the motion was
stricken without prejudice and plaintiff was permitted to make a properly denominated dispositive
motion after defendant had an opportunity to answer). But cf. Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United
States, 655 F. Supp. 506, 508 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (plaintiff's premature motion for declaratory
judgment was not stricken given the very substantial portion of the business affected, which
justified expedited treatment and alteration of normal procedure).
456. 636 F. Supp. at 939, quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941), cited with continued approval in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 102 (1983).
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Accordingly, the CIT will refrain from ordering declaratory judgments where the plaintiff lacks standing. In Yuri Fashions Co. v.
United States,457 an importer challenged the exclusion of merchandise
imported from the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands and
sought a declaratory judgment that the President's regulation, which
defined certain products of insular possessions of the United States
as subject to quota restraints, was ultra vires and void. Plaintiff al459
458
leged jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a) and 1581(i)(3)
and sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
CIT Rule 57. The court examined each issue on which plaintiff requested declaratory judgment to determine whether it presented "a
real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal
interests, [and was] a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical
or abstract.'460 The CIT concluded that plaintiff lacked standing under
section 1581(i) to challenge application of the regulation as applied to
the products or to challenge a directive of the Committee for Implementation of Textile Agreements, since the importer did not sufficiently allege it was adversely affected or aggrieved by the regula-

tion.461
Several of the cases brought by private litigants against the government have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In Detroit Zoological Society v. United States,462 the consignee of five
entries of merchandise filed a complaint to have all the entries deemed
liquidated by operation of law under 19 U. S.C. § 1504(a). The consignee
later moved to amend its complaint to assert a separate basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, and the United States moved to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 3 The CIT ruled that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, creating declaratory judgment actions, and 28 U.S.C. § 1585,

457. 632 F. Supp. 41, 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
458. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1980) provides that the Court of International Trade shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole
or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
459. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) provides the Court of International Trade with exclusive jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, of any civil action commenced against the United States, its
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for embargoes
or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the
protection of the public health or safety.
460. 632 F. Supp. at 49, quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979).
461. Id.
462. 630 F. Supp. 1350 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
463. Id. at 1353.
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giving the CIT powers coextensive with the district courts, do not
provide a basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the
consignee's protest as to customs duties imposed upon the merchandise
in question. 4r The CIT noted, however, that under the amended complaint which alleged 28 U.S.C. 1581(a), the court could have exercised
jurisdiction had no extensions of liquidation occurred when the protests
were filed. 465 The CIT took into account that the plaintiff did not have
an opportunity to discover facts relating to jurisdiction because discovery was stayed pending consideration of the motion. 4 - The CIT provided the plaintiff with an opportunity to establish subject matter
467
jurisdiction, and permitted the plaintiff to proceed with discovery.
Subject matter jurisdiction was also determined to be lacking in
Pagoda Trading Co. v. United States.468 The plaintiff there sought a
declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h)46 9 of invalidity of the ruling of
the Secretary of Treasury giving guidelines for classification of merchandise. The government alleged the court lacked jurisdiction in its
motion to dismiss plaintiff's action. 47° The CIT held that prior to importation, it lacked jurisdiction for the declaratory judgment of the Treasury Department guidelines for classification of the merchandise, since
the administrative decision complained of did not rule specifically on
471
the merchandise which the trading company intended to import.
"The defect in this action can be characterized in a number of ways
- as a lack of ripeness, as a failure to exhaust administrative remedies
or most specifically, as the absence of the sort of ruling for which
'' 4 72
section 1581(h) was intended.

464. Id. at 1359, citing Manufacture De Machines Du Haut Rhin v. Von Raab, 569 F. Supp.
877, 881 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1980) does not grant jurisdiction to the CIT)
(citing Kidco, Inc. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 103, 104 1982); Smith v. Lehman, 533 F.
Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y.) (28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1992) is not jurisdictional but rather remedial),
affd, 689 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173 (1983).
465. Detroit Zoological Soc'y, 630 F. Supp. at 1359.
466. Id. at 1360.
467. Id.
468. 577 F. Supp. 22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
469. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (1980) provides the Court of International Trade with "exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods
involved, a ruling issued by the Secretary of Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such a
ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry
requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing
the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably harmed unless given
such an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to such importation.
470. See Pagoda Trading Corp., 577 F. Supp. at 23.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 24.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

67

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 3

[Vol. 3

Pagoda is consistent with the standards enunciated by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, although the CIT did not refer to
any specific circuit decisions. The Federal Circuit has defined the requirements for invoking the CIT's declaratory judgment jurisdiction
under section 1581(h) as: (1) judicial review must be sought prior to
importation of goods; (2) review must be sought of a ruling, a refusal
to issue a ruling, or refusal to change such ruling; (3) the ruling must
relate to certain subject matter; and (4) irreparable harm4 73 must be
shown unless judicial review is obtained prior to importation. 474
Actions for declaratory relief have primarily been sought against
the Customs Service. In R.J.F. Fabrics, Inc. v. United States,475 an

importer under criminal investigation for attempting to violate industry quotas filed for declaratory judgment against the Customs Service
to determine the true country of origin of the goods in question. The
CIT held that the importer's civil action would be stayed in favor of
a criminal case pending against the importer. 476 In Vivitar Corp. v.
United States 477 an American trademark owner filed an action seeking

declaratory judgment that Customs Service was required to exclude
all imports bearing the owner's trademark that were entered without
the written consent of the owner. The plaintiff contended that an
unqualified right to demand such exclusion is provided under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526(a). 478 The plaintiff admitted that its overseas distributors were

wholly owned subsidiaries and that it consented to overseas manufacturers' applying the trademark to goods sold overseas. 479 Therefore,

the plaintiff admitted that all material facts existed for application of
Customs' policy but contested the legality of the policy.4 Judge Restani denied that request for declaratory relief holding section 1526(a)
did not give the plaintiff the unqualified right to demand exclusion of
the unauthorized imports bearing its trademark.481

473. The Court of International Trade has stated that "the standard for proving irreparable
harm [in the declaratory judgment context] is essentially identical to that used to determine
irreparable injury in cases where injunctive relief is sought." National Juice Prods. Ass'n v.
United States, 628 F. Supp. 978, 984 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), citing 718 Fifth Ave. Corp. v.
United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 195, 196 n.3 (1984).
474. 718 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Intl Trade 195, 196 (1984), citing American
Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
475. 651 F. Supp. 1437 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
476. Id. at 1441.
477. 593 F. Supp. 420, 422 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
478. Id.
479. Id. at 425.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 436.
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In a number of cases, requests for declaratory relief have been
directed against the executive branch. In American Ass'n of Exporters
& Importers Textile & Apparel Group,4S2a trade association representing domestic importers of textile and apparel products brought action
against the government challenging import restraints imposed by the
executive branch. The court held that the trade association failed to
state a valid cause of action in its complaint challenging the President's
actions which imposed quotas on textile imports. The Court ruled that
the quotas were authorized by the Agricultural Act and the findings
of fact supporting the decision to impose the restrictions, presented
nonjusticiable issues.- Similarly, an action was commenced by a trade
association and labor union in Luggage & Leather Goods Manufacturers
v. United States48 seeking a declaratory judgment that certain products were ineligible for Generalized System of Preferences (hereinafter
GSP) treatment, 48 and that the President acted contrary to law in
designating such products as eligible articles under the GSP program
and by failing to remove the products from the list of eligible articles
receiving duty-free treatment under the GSP.- Plaintiffs further requested the Court to enjoin defendants from maintaining the products
on the list of GSP eligible articles.- 7 Luggage & Leather Goods is
significant since the CIT granted the plaintiffs' requested relief. The
court determined that the products were ineligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP, it granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and directed the defendants to remove the items from the list
of eligible articles under the GSP.48 The CIT, however, did not expressly state that the declaratory judgment was granted.49
The federal courts, including the CIT, recognized that the declaratory judgment is a nonexclusive remedy. Many of the litigants seeking
such relief from the CIT also requested alternative remedies. In Sea-

482. 583 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
483. Id.
484. 588 F. Supp. 1413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
485. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 et. seq. (1984).
486. 588 F. Supp. at 1418.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1427.
489. But cf. United States Cane Sugar Refiner's Ass'n v. Block, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 196 (1982)
(Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be inequitable where plaintiff sought
declaratory and injunctive relief and customs officials had no authority to override the presidential
proclamation imposing import quotas on products. However, application for relief was denied
since the import quotas fall within the President's authority. The proclamation was consistent
with both the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and the International Sugar Agreement.).
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side Realty v. United States,490 an importer commenced an action for
a declaratory judgment that importation of a product did not violate
the Tariff Act of 1930, for return of the seized product for exportation,
or alternatively, for an order in the nature of mandamus directing the
Customs Service to commence an action in CIT pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1582(1), concerning a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592, as it related to
the seized merchandise. 49 1 The government moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that the CIT did not have jurisdiction to order the
return of the merchandise or issue a declaratory judgment to the
effect that section 1592 had not been violated. 4 - The CIT determined
that the request for declaratory judgment in the section of the Tariff
Act of 1930 proscribing fraud in the entry of an item into the commerce
was premature and thus, did not grant it since the Customs Service
had not yet determined whether an action would be instituted under
such section. 4 9- The CIT also denied the importer's alternative request
for mandamus because the request was also premature. The writ may
only be used to compel the performance of a ministerial act, and may
4 94
not be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion.
Many different forms of injunctive relief have been alternatively
sought in actions requesting declaratory judgments. In an early CIT
decision, Tropicana Products v. United States,'9 5 the plaintiff requested injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction under
CIT Rule 65, and by amended complaint, a declaratory judgment. The
issue presented was whether plaintiff was engaged in a manufacturing
process prohibited by section 562 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 4 - The CIT
applied the four relevant factors in considering an application for a
preliminary injunction: (1) a threat of immediate irreparable harm; (2)
the public interest would be better served by issuing than by denying
the injunction; (3) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that
the balance of hardship on the parties favors the plaintiff.49 The court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to make a requisite showing of the
probability of success on the merits, which is particularly important
where there is not a clear showing of threat of irreparable injury, and

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
216 (Ct.

607 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
Id. at 1482.
Id.
Id. at 1483.
Id.
3 Ct. Int'l Trade 171 (1982).
Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1562 (1970).
3 Ct. Int'l Trade at 174, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp.
Int'l Trade 1980).
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denied the request for a preliminary injunction. 4 9 In addition, the
court also denied the request for a declaratory relief. In a subsequent
4
decision, the plaintiffs in Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United States 9
sought both declaratory relief and injunctive relief in the form of
continuance of a temporary restraining order. The CIT denied the
plaintiffs' motion for declaratory and injunctive relief and dissolved
the temporary restraining order.6 The CIT determined, however, that
Customs' action in declaring the license at issue to be null and void
was contrary to law and enjoined defendants from taking any further
action with respect to the license to effectuate such nullification.51
Judge Restani underscored the nonexclusive nature of the relief
sought in actions for a declaratory judgment in Vivitar Corp.0 the
plaintiffs complaint originally sought relief in the nature of mandamus.w The plaintiff in a subsequent complaint, acknowledged that
declaratory relief would be sufficient. - "Therefore, the court will treat
plaintiffs action as one for declaratory or injunctive relief. '' - 5 Apparently, the CIT, even on its own motion, will alternatively consider
granting declarative or other appropriate relief.
Relief in an alternative form can also be sought simultaneously in
another federal court. An importer in Lois Jeans & Jackets, U.S.A.
v. United States- filed an action in the CIT seeking injunctive relief
to prevent the implementation of a prior Customs' ruling, which plaintiff was not promptly notified of, and filed simultaneously a declaratory
judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York concerning a related trademark infringement
issue. The CIT was persuaded to grant injunctive relief since: (1) the
plaintiff demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that Customs
Service had not complied with its notice and opportunity for comment
regulations; and (3) the balance of hardships tipped in favor of the
plaintiff.- The CIT, however, determined "the forum of choice respecting the infringement issue from the standpoint of judicial expertise, economy and efficiency, is clearly in the [d]istrict [c]ourt. '"
498.
499.
500.

See 3 Ct. Int'l Trade at 176-77.
546 F. Supp. 558 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
Id. at 566.

501.

Id.

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

593
Id.
Id.
Id.
566
Id.
Id.

F. Supp. 420, 422 n.1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).

F. Supp. 1523 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
at 1526-29.
at 1528.
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The interrelationship between mandamus, prohibition, declaratory
judgments, and injunctions is crucial in comprehending the CIT's use
of extraordinary remedies. The CIT has not granted either a writ of
mandamus or prohibition. It may be that an effective strategy for
CIT litigants in certain situations, where subject matter jurisdiction
can be established, would be simultaneously to request declaratory
relief and injunctive relief. It remains to be determined, however,
whether this tactic would actually increase the likelihood of success
for litigants seeking the prompt correction of erroneous agency action.
Declaratory relief has been sought for Customs Service decisions
but not as yet for proceedings before the ITA or the ITC. The plenary
power of the court to provide relief in the form of a declaratory
judgment, may suggest that interested parties aggrieved by agency
action believed to be erroneous should seek to correct such action in
the specific field of trade utilizing the declaratory judgment, as well
as other extraordinary legal remedies in appropriate circumstances.
The CIT ought not deprive international trade litigants the benefit of
its use of the full panopoly of judicial tools which the court has already
extended to customs litigants.
The power of the CIT to provide declaratory relief is vast. It has
effectively applied extraordinary remedies in limited areas and ought
in accordance with the historical nature of these tools, adapt the standards of the other federal courts and wisely utilize them in international
trade cases in appropriate circumstances. The CIT should not hesitate
to develop standards sensitive to its unique jurisdiction for utilizing
these remedies to control its judicial process and to ensure the effective
delivery of justice to all CIT litigants.
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